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Intersexuality and Universal Marriage
Michael L Rosin
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the public furor that would erupt if Jake, a young, wounded veteran of the Iraq 
war returned home after an arduous rehabilitation, intending to marry his high school 
sweetheart Ashley and was denied a marriage license because of his war wounds: the 
loss of his penis and testicles thanks to a land mine. Talk shows would queue up to have 
the couple as guests. Politicians would offer their services to marry the couple in some 
other, more liberal state.
Nonetheless, one of the most “traditional” views of marriage, that is strenuously invoked 
against same-sex marriage (so called), would be forced by its own arguments to refuse to 
sanction the marriage of our wounded war veteran. Canon 1084 §1 of the Roman 
Catholic Code of Cannon Law emphatically states
Antecedent and perpetual impotence to have intercourse, whether on the part of 
the man or the woman, whether absolute or relative, nullifies marriage by its very 
nature.1
On this view, Jake’s war wound would prevent him from marrying Ashley or anyone else 
in a Roman Catholic ceremony. 
Whether the Roman Catholic Church or any other religious denomination should perform 
such a marriage is a matter for that religious denomination to decide and is not a matter 
of public policy. Whether the various states of the union should sanction such a marriage 
is a matter of public policy. Fortunately, no state law denies a marriage license to a war 
veteran wounded in such a way or anyone else whose genitals and gonads have been 
grievously damaged or surgically removed to cure their diseased state.
If one of the most traditional views on marriage used to argue against same-sex marriage 
constructs a boundary for heterosexual marriage that is out of line with popular sentiment 
and the law in all 50 states then certainly their arguments that marriage is the union of 
one man and one woman should be subject to critical examination.
As the Bush administration puts it weight behind the proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment that state
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman.
1 Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Title VII, Chapter III, Canon 1084, §1, online at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__P3Y.HTM, last visited February 18, 2004.
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many states are rushing to enact similar amendments with even more speed. However, 
very few have noticed that any such amendment (or statute) immediately raises the 
questions of “Who is a woman?” and “Who is a man?”
The Supreme Court has many times held that the right to marry is a fundamental, 
protected liberty.2 Defenders of the traditional view of marriage argue that the right to 
marry is the right of a woman to marry a man and the right of a man to marry a woman. If 
that is the case and if marriage is a fundamental right available to every person (of 
sufficient age and mental competence to contract) then the questions “Who is a woman?” 
and “Who is a man?” are of fundamental importance. Failure to answer these questions 
so that the woman-man distinction is exclusive and exhaustive can result in a court 
deciding that a person is incapable of marrying anyone! An Australian court handed 
down just such a decision in 1979!3
After more than a millennium of trying to squeeze all of humanity into one of two 
categories labeled “FEMALE” and “MALE” it is time for western law catch up to 
biology and medicine and realize that FEMALE and MALE are not fundamental 
metaphysical categories that neatly or even messily classify all human beings 
unambiguously. After two thousand years biology and medicine finally recognize that 
“female” and “male” are adjectives for anatomical, hormonal, and other characteristics. 
These characteristics typically align into what we recognize as “women” and “men”, but 
not all of the time. Nineteenth4 and twentieth century biomedical discoveries have 
revealed that variations from the typical developmental paths occur during early 
embryonic development. A wide variety of physically intersexed conditions with atypical 
combinations of sexual characteristics can result.5 After surveying the relevant medical 
literature published between 1955 and 2000 Anne Fausto-Sterling and her colleagues 
estimated that the frequency of individuals receiving “corrective” genital surgery runs 
2
 Most notably in Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535 (1942); Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967); Zablocki v 
Redhail, 434 US 374 (1978).
3 In the Marriage of C. and D. (Falsely Called C), 35 Fed L Rep 340 (Family Court of Australia 1979).
4
 “As early as 1836 Isidore Geoffroy Saint Hilaire [1805-1861] after having demonstrated ‘how general is 
the influence exercised by the testes or the ovaries on the organization,’ explains the ‘hermaphroditism’ of 
the genital tract as produced during development by an ‘influence exercised directly upon the ovary or the 
testis, and indirectly, through its intermediary, upon the remainder of the genital tract.” (Alfred Jost, 
Problems of Fetal Endocrinology: The Gonadal and Hypophyseal Hormones, 8 Recent Progress in 
Hormone Research, 379 (1953)). The citation is to Isidore Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, 2 Histoire générale et 
particulière des anomalies de l'organisation chez l'homme et les animaux, ou, Traité de tératologie: 
ouvrage comprenant des recherches sur les caractères, la classification, l'influence physiologique et 
pathologique, les rapports généraux, les lois et les causes des monstruosités, des variétés et vices de 
conformation 58 (J.-B. Baillière 1832-1837).
5
 For a review of gender identity development of intersexed persons see generally Kenneth J. Zucker, 
Intersexuality and Gender Identity Differentiation, 10 Annual Rev Sex Research 1 (1999).
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between 1 and 2 per 1,000 live births.6 In contrast, the 2000 Florida vote for President 
was decided by approximately 1 vote in 10,000.7
Atypical combinations can even be found at the chromosomal level. Most of us learned 
about “XX” and “XY” sex chromosome pairs in introductory biology courses. These are 
the typical combinations usually identified as “female” and “male,” but there are others. 
Some people lack a second sex chromosome. (“X0”, Turner Syndrome). Some people 
have three (“XXY”, Klinefelter Syndrome), four, or even five sex chromosomes. Most 
bothersome for any attempt at a strictly binary classification scheme of FEMALE and 
MALE, some individuals have an abundance of cells with “XX” sex chromosomes pairs 
as well as an abundance of cells with “XY” sex chromosomes pairs.
Any attempt to classify all of humanity into two exclusive and exhaustive categories for 
the sake of marriage, FEMALE and MALE, will fail, just as early 20 th century attempt to 
define “the white race” to restrict immigration failed.8 A classification seeking 
certainty by using many characteristics will leave some people in a twilight zone, 
classified as neither female nor male and deprived of the right to marry anyone. A 
classification seeking simplicity using only one or two key characteristics will have 
incongruous results. Some apparent “opposite-sex” marriages will turn out to be “same-
sex” marriages.
Reproduction requires complementary female and male functionality. There can be no 
doubt of that. Certainly, those couples wishing and able to conceive children are 
especially privileged. I concur wholeheartedly with “traditionalists” that marriage 
provides a preferred setting for child-rearing. As a widowed, adoptive parent 
who was one half of an infertile couple, no one knows these last two points better than I 
do. However, neither child-rearing nor even reproductive capability is required in a 
marriage. There is a long tradition in Anglo-American law that infertility, even if it is 
certain, does not provide grounds for annulment or divorce.9
6
 Melanie Blackless, Anthony Charuvastra, Amanda Derryck, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Karl Lauzanne, and 
Ellen Lee, How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 Am J Hum Biol 151 (2000) online 
at http://bms.brown.edu/faculty/f/afs/dimorphic.pdf.  (Last visited on June 1, 2004.) They also estimate that 
as many as 2% of all persons have some variation from the “ideal male or female.”
7
 According to the 2000 Official General Election Results posted by the Federal Election Commission Bush 
received 2,912,790 votes, Gore received 2,912,253 votes, all other candidates received 138,067 votes for a 
total of 5,963,110 votes counted. (Data online at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm last 
visited June 6, 2004.) Bush’s total exceeded Gore’s by 537 votes, approximately 1 in 10,000!
8
 See the discussions below of Ozawa v United States, 260 US 178 (1922) and United States v Thind, 261 
US 204 (1923), as well as Loving, 388 US 1 (1967).
9
 In 1968 a New Jersey court reasoned “If the begetting of children were the chief end of marriage, it 
should follow that our public policy would favor annulling marriage in sterility cases where the fact of 
sterility is unknown to the parties at the time of the marriage. But no statute in this state permits annulment 
in such cases.” T v M, 100 NJ Super 530,538, 242 A2d 670,674-5 (1968). Reading this passage in isolation 
one wonders how a spouse could have possibly brought an annulment suit on grounds of infertility in the
1960s. By then it was well established that sterility was not grounds for annulment. In fact, T v M is the 
exception that proves the rule that in the eyes of the law marriage is not about reproduction. In T v M the 
couple conceived a pregnancy without sexually consummating their marriage! When they attempted sexual 
intercourse the husband could not penetrate his wife due to her vaginismus. “On one occasion the husband 
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Professor Julie Greenberg of Thomas Jefferson Law School in San Diego is among the 
few who have noticed the importance of the questions “who is a woman?” and “who is a 
man?” Professor Greenberg proposed that 
the law reject the currently accepted biologically based model for determining sex 
and instead adopt a more flexible approach that emphasizes gender self-
identification.10
I make a more radical proposal.
Once we realize that "female" and "male" are no more than adjectives describing a 
variety of anatomical and hormonal characteristics that do not always align in the typical 
fashion we must conclude that the law cannot require that marriage be the union of one 
WOMAN and one MAN and still hold marriage to be a basic civil right available to every
person.11 Instead of talking about the topic of the day as "same-sex marriage" we should 
used force in his attempt to penetrate. This resulted in his ejaculating against the vulva, causing a 'splash 
pregnancy'.” (Id A at 671) A few months later the wife miscarried. The relevant New Jersey statute read
The parties, or either of them, were at the time of marriage physically and incurably impotent, 
provided the party making the application shall have been ignorant of such impotency or 
incapability at the time of the marriage, and has not subsequently ratified the marriage. (NJ Rev 
Stat 2A:34-1(c), cited id at 673)
According to Judge Hartman “The action [was] not contested on the merits” (id at 671) and he granted the 
annulment.
In 1943 an English court granted an annulment in the case of a sexually unconsummated marriage with a 
child born from a “splash pregnancy” (also called fecundation ab extra). See Clarke (otherwise Talbott) v 
Clarke, [1943] 2 All ER 540.
Surprisingly, there are no reported cases in which one spouse in an adoptive couple sought an annulment on 
grounds of the other spouse’s physical incapacity.
Failing to tell an intended spouse of your known sterility, from surgery for example, can provide the basis 
for an annulment on the grounds of fraudulent representation. (See for example Turner v Avery, 92 NJ Eq 
473, 113 A 710 (NJ Chancery 1921).) However, sterility in and of itself does not provide grounds for 
annulment. (See, for example, C. E. Jorden v Catherine M. Jorden, 93 Ill App 633 (Ill App 2d Dist) (1900); 
Larsen v Larsen, 88 Pa Super 98 (1926); Reed v Reed, 26 Tenn App 690, 177 SW2d 26 (1943); Gibbs v 
Gibbs, 156 Fla 404, 23 So2d 382 (1945).)
10
 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between Law and 
Biology, 41 Ariz L Rev 265,270 (1999).
11
 David Berreby suggested just this argument in his article Quelle Différence? Biology dooms the Defense 
of Marriage Act posted on Slate on 09 /11/1996. (Online at http://slate.msn.com/id/3118, last visited June 1, 
2004.) and then must have moved on to his next deadline.
I have found approximately 50 English language articles in law journals that discuss the marriage rights of 
physically intersexed and transsexual people going back to G. W. Bartholomew, Hermaphrodites and the 
Law, 2 U Malaya L Rev 83 (1960). This is one of the few articles that give significant emphasis to 
physically intersexed persons. Professor Greenberg’s article is the first American law journal that places 
significant emphasis on the physically intersexed. Among others that give significant emphasis to the 
physically intersexed are David William Meyers, Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration, 36 
Medico-Legal J 174 (1968); Rebecca J. Bailey, Family Law – Decree of Nullity of Marriage of a True 
Hermaphrodite Who Has Undergone Sex-Change Surgery, 53 Australian L J 659 (1979); H. A. Finlay, 
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be talking about "universal marriage", the right of any two unmarried (not closely 
related) adult persons to marry each other and enjoy its legal benefits12 (and obligations) 
regardless of the genital activities made possible and impossible by their sexual 
anatomies.
In 1996 during an earlier round of this culture war Hadley Arkes, the Edward Ney 
Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College and a staunch 
opponent of universal marriage gave testimony to the House Judiciary Committee) in 
Sexual Identity and the Law of Nullity, 54 Australian L J 115 (1980); and H. A. Finlay, Legal Recognition 
of Transsexuals in Australia, 12 J Contemp Health L & Pol'y 503 (1996).
A large majority of the articles focused on transsexuals argue in favor of a post-operative transsexual’s 
right to marry someone of the same physical birth sex. Ian MacColl Kennedy was the first to emphasize the 
link between transsexual marriage and same-sex marriage. (Transsexualism and Single Sex Marriage, 2 
Anglo-Am L Rev 112 (1973).) A few commentators oppose transsexual marriage, notably Meyers, 
Problems of Sex Determination and Alteration; Stan Twardy, Medicolegal aspects of transsexualism, 27 
Med Trial Technique Quarterly 249 (1980); James J. Graham, Transsexualism and the Capacity to Enter 
Marriage, 41 The Jurist 117 (1981); and David Lee Mundy, Note: Hitting Below The Belt: Sex-Ploitive 
Ideology & the Disaggregation of Sex and Gender, 14 Regent U L Rev 215 (2002). Mundy’s is the most 
vociferous voice, arguing emphatically against “changing the legal definition of sex from objective biology 
to subjective gender identity” (id at 234, emphasis added) out of concern for “the subjectivization of sex 
and its logical effect on society and the law.” (Id at 217.) Eight times Mundy insists that the law use an 
objective definition of sex (id at 216, 217, 218, 231, 234 twice, 237, and 239) yet he never presents a 
biological definition!
Mundy asserts
The debate regarding the legal definition of sex is, at its core, ontological. It cuts right to the quick 
of one's assumptions about the nature of man and the law. If, for example, sex is a biological 
accident and there are no inherent biological differences between men and women, then the idea of 
sex itself must be a social creation arbitrarily or capriciously constructed. Conversely, if gender 
differences reflect a natural order that is, at least in part, biological, then differentiation based on 
our design is not inherently irrational or oppressive; rather, it is possible that men and women can 
be different and complementary without being necessarily unequal. (Id at 216-217, citations 
omitted.)
and completely ignores the question of whether the FEMALE-MALE distinction is exhaustive and 
exclusive. In the end Mundy takes refuge in Judeo-Christian origins.
Beyond the dangers of judicial activism, however, there are other reasons why the law should 
remain objective with regards to sex. Our western legal system is "[g]rounded in the Judeo-
Christian ethic . . . From the Judeo-Christian worldview, sex differentiation is not a mere construct 
but is integral even to the story of salvation. (Id at 237, citations omitted.)
Whether or not sex differentiation is integral to the story of salvation is beyond the scope of this Article 
and, more importantly, any American court of law.
12
 A partial list of “The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license” [in Massachusetts] may be 
found in Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge  et al v Department of Public Health, et 
al, 440 Mass 309,___ (2003). Some of these benefits, such as the “the prohibition against spouses testifying 
against one another about their private conversations, applicable in both civil and criminal cases” (Id at 
___) are only granted by the state and cannot be made available to marriage partners by each other or a 
relevant third party such as an employer.
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support of the Defense of Marriage Act. During his testimony Professor Arkes 
confidently testified
We are, each of us, born a man or a woman. The committee needs no testimony 
from an expert witness to decode this point.13
This is precisely a point on which the Committee and the American body politic do need 
expert testimony. Fortunately for the taxpayers, the Committee need travel no farther than 
Baltimore to visit the Brady Urological Institute at the Johns Hopkins University Medical 
School. Over the last 100 years Johns Hopkins researchers have been at the forefront of 
unraveling the mysteries of intersexuality, most notably the uro-genital surgeon Hugh 
Hampton Young14 in the first half of the 20th century, then his successors the uro-genital 
surgeons Howard W. Jones, Jr. and William Wallace Scott15, and the psychologist John 
Money.16
Contemporary bio-medicine recognizes 8 sexual characteristics.17
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex—typically XX or XY; but there are many other 
variations 
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)-- ovaries or testes (or ovotestes);
3. Internal morphologic sex --- uterus/fallopian tubes/upper vagina or 
prostrate/seminal vesicles/vas deferens/epididymis; 
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia)-- clitoris/labia  or penis/scrotum; 
5. Hormonal sex—estrogens or androgens; 
6. Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features) --  breasts or facial and chest hair; 
7. Assigned sex and gender of rearing; and 
8. Sexual identity (not sexual orientation)
Each of these characteristics has a typical female and male form. (Or feminine and 
masculine if you prefer.) For most individuals these 8 characteristics align in typical 
fashion that we label with the words “female” and “male”, but they do not align not for 
all of us. 
In this Article I choose to focus on just the first 4 characteristics listed above. They are all 
present at birth. Focusing on these physical characteristics avoids much of the heat that 
has been generated arguing the role of nature versus nurture in recent debates about 
13 Online at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/22356.htm last visited February, 24, 2004.
14
 See generally Hugh Hampton Young, Genital Abnormalities; Hermpahroditism & Related Adrenal 
Diseases (Williams & Wilkins 1937).
15
 See generally Howard W. Jones and William Wallace Scott, Hermaphroditism, Genital Anomalies, and 
Related Endocrine Disorders (Williams & Wilkins, 2d ed, 1971).
16
 Among his many works see John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman, Boy & Girl: The 
Differentiation and Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity (Johns Hopkins 1972) and 
John Money, Sex Errors of the Body and Related Syndromes: A Guide to Counseling Children, 
Adolescents, and Their Families,(P.H. Brookes, 2d ed, 1994).
17
 Id at 4.
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homosexuality. Certainly, physical characteristics present at birth cannot be the products 
of the newborn’s emotional experience.
In retrospect many of the 19th century cases discussed below involved wives who 
experienced Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome or Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster Syndrome, 
two particular forms of physically intersexuality. However, none of the parties involved 
in these cases were aware of physical intersexuality. These cases always turned on the 
question of whether the wife was physically capable of consummating the marriage. 
There have been very few legal cases questioning the sex of a physically intersexed 
person. However, there have been somewhat more cases questioning the sex of 
psychically intersexed persons, more often called “transsexuals.” Consequently, this 
Article needs to consider these cases as it examines the question of who is a woman and 
who is a man in the eyes of the law. As the eminent anthropologist Clifford Geertz has 
commented “Intersexuality is more than an empirical surprise; it is a cultural 
challenge.”18 For “culture” we should read “law!”
Part II briefly surveys the intersexed in western thought with special attention to the law. 
Part III analyzes 5 cases in which courts attempted to provide a definition of sex in the 
context of marriage between 1970 and 2002. Part IV critiques traditional views of the 
role of sexual consummation and reproduction in marriage. Part V analyses the demand 
for strict binarism. Part VI asks whether sexual disambiguation surgery can be a legal 
prerequisite for marriage. The Conclusion in Part VII argues that there is a long tradition 
that the passage of time as well as the reproductive sex act can ratify a marriage. This is 
now specifically embodied in the statutes of 12 states that place a time limit on 
annulment suits for physical incapacity. (One state requires that the petitioner cease 
voluntary cohabitation as soon as the other party’s impotency is learned.) The Appendix 
presents a brief survey of physically intersexed conditions. (It can be read at any time.)
II A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE INTERSEXED IN WESTERN THOUGHT
The physically intersexed, also known as hermaphrodites, have fascinated western 
thought since classical times. They appear in both works of art and works of reason.
A. The Ancient World
The word “hermaphrodite” comes from the name of “Hermaphroditus” a son of the gods 
Hermes and Aphrodite who were themselves the embodiments of ideal manhood and 
womanhood. Hermaphroditus himself grew to become a splendid example of manhood. 
In Book IV of his Metamorphoses the Roman poet Ovid (43BC-17AD) tells The Story of 
Salmacis and Hermaphroditus. When the nymph Salmacis caught a glimpse of 
Hermaphroditus she immediately fell rapturously in love with him and threw herself on 
him. When Hermaphroditus who “knew nought of love”19 sought to extricate himself 
from her entangling embraces, Salmacis implored
18
 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge – Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 81 (Basic Books 1983).
19
 Ovid, The Story of Salmacis and Hermaphroditus, in Metamorphoses, Bk. IV, l.53 (John Dryden trans).
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Oh may the Gods thus keep us ever join'd! 
Oh may we never, never part again!20
Salmacis’s plea did not go in vain. The gods obliged her request by merging their two 
bodies into one!
Both bodies in a single body mix, 
A single body with a double sex.21
Hippocrates (460-360BC), the father of western medicine, held that the uterus had seven 
cells.22 A fetus gestating in one of the three rightmost cells would develop into a male. 
One gestating in one of the three leftmost cells would develop into a female. A fetus 
gestating in the middle cell would develop into an hermaphrodite with female and male 
genitalia. For Hippocrates hermaphrodites constituted a genuine third sex on a spectrum 
with male and female at opposite ends.23
Aristotle, like Hippocrates, held that males gestate on the right side of the uterus and 
females on the left side, but for a very different reason. According to Aristotle, the greater 
heat provided by the liver on the right side of the body causes the fetus to be fully 
concocted (as he called it) and develop into a male. The lesser heat provided by the 
spleen on the left side causes the fetus to be incompletely concocted, resulting in a 
female, an incompletely developed male.24
Aristotle viewed male and female as polar opposites with no intermediate forms. Yet he 
was well aware of the existence of hermaphrodites and had a ready explanation for them. 
According to Aristotle extra sexual organs, like extra fingers or toes, result from an 
excess of generative matter; too much for one embryo and not enough for two.25
Speaking of extra sexual organs in particular he wrote
In certain cases we find a double set of generative organs one male and the other 
female. When such duplication occurs the one is always functional but not the 
other, because it is always insufficiently supplied with nourishment as being 
contrary to Nature; it is attached like a growth (for such growths also receive 
nourishment though they are a later development than the body proper and 
contrary to Nature.) If the formative power prevails, both are similar; if it is 
20
 Id at ll 102-103.
21
 Id at ll 112-113.
22
 G.E.R. Lloyd, Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece 176 
(Cambridge 1983). Galen (129-210) and his school also adhered to the seven cell theory of the uterus. See 
Fridolf Kudlein, The Seven Cells of the Uterus: The Doctrine and Its Roots, 49 Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 415-416 (1965).
23
 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, The Hermaphrodite and the Orders of Nature: Sexual Ambiguity in 
Early Modern France, 1 GLQ: a Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies 421 (1996).
24
 Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 765a35-766b8 (Oxford 1912) (Arthur Platt, trans).
25
 Id at 772b15.
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altogether vanquished, both are similar; but if it prevail here and be vanquished 
there, then the one is female and the other male. 26
B. The Physically Intersexed and Western Legal Theory
The differences in the legal rights and responsibilities of women and men have withered 
away to almost nothing in the last century. Until recently being declared a woman or a 
man had a significant legal impact. For over a millennium western legal authors 
occasionally mentioned hermaphrodites. In the first great treatise on English law Henry 
de Bracton (died 1268) wrote
Mankind may also be classified in another way: male, female, or hermaphrodite. 
Women differ from men in many respects, for their position is inferior to that of 
men.
A hermaphrodite is classified with male or female according to the predominance 
of the sexual organs.27
Nearly four centuries later in 1628 Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) wrote
Every heire is either a male or a female, or an hermaphrodite, that is both male 
and female. And an hermaphrodite (which is also called Androgynus) shall be 
heire, either as male or female, according to that kind of sex which doth prevaile. 
And accordingly it must be baptized.28
These are the best known representatives of a tradition going back at least as far as 
Ulpian (Roman, 160-228) and including the Emperor Justinian I (483-565),  Azo of 
Bologna (~1150-1230), and William Forbes (Scottish, died 1745). All of these writers 
supposed that one sex prevailed.
The 12th century Jewish rabbi/theologian/doctor/lawyer Maimonides (1135-1204) was 
educated in the confluence of Jewish and Islamic traditions. In The Book of Women he 
provides a detailed diagnostic procedure for determining whether a person is woman, 
man, hermaphrodite (both male and female genitals), or a tumtum (neither male nor 
female genitals).29 According to Maimonides an hermaphrodite or a tumtum could 
become betrothed and seek to marry either a man or a woman.30 However, the validity of 
such a betrothal was immediately in doubt and required a judgment of validity before a 
marriage could take place.
26
 Id at 772b25-32.
27
 Henry de Bracton, 2 On The Laws And Customs of England 31-32 (Belknap 1968) (Samuel E. Thorne, 
trans).
28
 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part Of The Institutes Of The Laws Of England Bk.1 Ch.1 Sect. 1 (Garland, 
1832 ed, 1979,)
29
 Moses Maimonides, 4 The Code Of Maimonides, Book 4 The Book Of Women 9-14 (Yale 1972) (Isaac 
Klein, trans).
30
 Id at 26.
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That was the legal theory. What happened in fact?
C. The Intersexed and Western Legal Fact: A 1601 Case from France
These passages from leading legal theorists all neglected one important point. Ambiguous 
sexual characteristics may not appear and are certainly not of primary importance until 
adolescence, by which time a person’s sexual identity may have become well established 
in the community.
The historians Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park31 and Thomas Laqueur32 have 
reported how this reality had the utmost impact for the 20 year old Marin le Marcis in the 
small town of Angerville d’Orcher in Normandy in 1601. Le Marcis was initially 
christened “Marie”, raised as a girl, and employed as a maidservant. In her late teens le 
Marcis began dressing as a man, took the masculine name “Marin”, and announced his 
intention to marry his fellow maidservant, the widow Jeanne le Fevre. When Marin took 
Jeanne to meet his parents they asked him how he could possibly support a widow with 
two children.33
The local French authorities’ concerns were much less pragmatic. They charged Jeanne 
and Marin with having committed lesbian acts. They also charged Marin with usurping 
masculine name and dress.34 At the trial in Rouen the medical examiners testified that le 
Marcis’ external genitalia were feminine.35 His master and mistress each testified that le 
Marcis had had regular menstrual periods.36 (One wonders how the master knew this!) 
The widow le Fevre testified that le Marcis had satisfied her “naturally, and adequately 
accomplished the works of marriage, with equal or greater pleasure than she had with her 
deceased husband, with whom she had engendered children” the three or four times they 
had had sexual intercourse.37 Le Marcis defended himself by saying that “he had only 
made use of what nature had formed in him” and that his penis became visible only when 
erect. Unfortunately, due to illness and “timidity” he was unable to arouse himself and 
demonstrate this claim.38
The Rouen court delivered a guilty verdict with severe penalties for their unnatural acts. 
It sentenced Le Marcis to be hanged and then burned. The widow le Fevre was sentenced 
to watch the execution, be whipped in public for three days, have her possessions 
confiscated, and then be banished from Normandy.39
31
 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Hermaphrodites in Renaissance France, 1(5) Critical Matrix 1 
(1985) and Daston and Park, 1 GLQ at 421.
32
 Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud 136-137 (Harvard 1990).
33
 Daston and Park, 1(5) Critical Matrix at 1.
34
 Id at 2.
35
 Id.
36
 Laqueur, Making Sex at 136.
37
 Daston and Park, 1 GLQ at 429.
38
 Daston and Park, 1(5) Critical Matrix at 2.
39
 Daston and Park, 1 GLQ at 426.
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After the trial Jacques Duval, one of the medical examiners, decided to try another 
method of examination. He inserted his finger into le Marcis’ vulva and found the penis 
le Marcis had described. Duval convinced himself that the organ was a penis and not a 
clitoris after he rubbed it until a thick masculine semen was ejaculated.40 Duval reported 
this to the courts. However, the other medical examiners refused to perform such an 
examination and stood by their diagnosis.41
The court lifted its drastic sentences on le Marcis and le Fevre. However, it also realized 
that the medical examiners would never give a unanimous opinion on le Marcis. In a 
judgment that eerily presages a 1979 judgment in Australia, the court decreed that for the 
next four years le Marcis had to dress as a woman and refrain from sex (not to mention 
marriage) with both men and women.42 Ten years later le Marcis was seen with a beard, 
working as a tailor and living as a man.43
III. RECENT CASES DEFINING SEX IN THE CONTEXT OF MARRIAGE AS THE UNION OF ONE 
MAN AND ONE WOMAN
There is no uniform case or statute law on the questions of who is a woman and who is a 
man. Over the past 35 years several courts in English speaking jurisdictions have faced 
just such definitional questions, most often in cases involving post-operative transsexuals. 
40
 Daston and Park, 1(5) Critical Matrix at 2. Le Marcis’ symptoms fit a diagnosis of 5-reductase 2 
deficiency if we accept Duval’s detection of a penis inside le Marcis’ vulva instead of le Marcis’ mistress 
and master’s observation of regular menstrual periods.
41
 Jean Riolan diagnosed a prolapsed uterus. “Although he had not examined le Marcis first hand, Riolan 
argued a priori that there was insufficient space in the vulva to accommodate the anatomical structures 
necessary for male erection and ejaculation.” (Daston and Park, 1 GLQ at 433, n31.)
42 Id at 426.
43
 Le Marcis’ medical history appears remarkably similar to that of Moragu, Herdt and Davidson’s subject 
10 in their study of persons experiencing 5-reductase 2 deficiency among the Sambia of Papua New 
Guinea. (Gilbert H. Herdt and Julian Davidson, The Sambia “Turnim Man: Sociocultural and Clinical 
Aspects of Gender Formation in Male Pseudohermaphrodites with 5-Alpha-Reductase Deficiency in Papua 
New Guinea, 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior 33 (1988).)
Moragu was 29 years old, assigned to the female sex, and reared as a female. In the mid 1970s, at 
about age 18, Moragu was discovered by his husband to have a penis. . . 
The mid-wife reported how at birth she felt that Moragu’s genitals were odd: the top of the labia 
was “too small,” and the bottom “too big,” for a normal female infant. The mother insisted that 
they not disclose this, for fear that others would think that the baby was strange. . .
It was also reported that after the onset of puberty, the subject developed a thin fine mustache. . .
Moragu was then married formally to a man of a neighboring village. He had not yet experience 
menarche yet, which is normal, since here menarche is late [19.2 years] and marriage contracts are 
begun before a woman reaches menarche. No genital-to-genital intercourse is permitted until 
menarche. . .
He [Moragu’s husband] reported how he initiated sex between them, and that they had genital-to-
genital intercourse once, though he was able to penetrate only an inch or two. The next time, 
frustrated, he pulled back Moragu’s grass skirt to examine the genital area. He said he saw a small 
penis in the middle of the labia, with testes thick and undeveloped on both sides. He was shocked, 
became angry, and thus rejected Moragu “as being a man, like me.” (Id at 46-48)
Marie le Marcis might have met the same fate had she remained in a female sex role and married a man 
rather than adopted a male sex role as Marin le Marcis.
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They have reached widely different conclusions. Courts in England, Texas, and Kansas 
have held that post-operative transsexuals have not changed their sex and, therefore, their 
marriages to persons of the same anatomical birth sex were null ab initio. On the other 
hand courts in New Jersey, New Zealand, Australia, California, and Florida44 have held 
that post-operative transsexuals have indeed changed their sex and upheld the validity of 
their marriages to persons of the sex opposite their new sex. 
A. The Essential Role of a Woman in Marriage (Corbett v Corbett , England, 1970)
The 1970 English case Corbett v Corbett45 is the first marital case that called into 
question the sex of one of the parties in the eyes of the law. Corbett v Corbett is an 
annulment case. It does not make for happy reading. In common with many of the cases 
discussed in this Article it involved highly antagonistic parties each having a significant 
personal stake in the outcome of the case.
Arthur Corbett married April Ashley in September 1963. Arthur was 43, April was 28. 
April had been born George Jamieson and had sex reassignment surgery in 1960. Arthur 
and April lived together for no more than 14 days. Arthur sued for a decree of nullity on 
the grounds that April was a man and not a woman. Arthur also asserted that the marriage 
had never been consummated. April countersued asserting that they had attempted 
consummation but that Arthur had not completed the sexual act due to incapacity or 
willful refusal. 
44
 These last 4 cases, not discussed here, all involve post-operative spouses who entered into marriage with 
someone of the sex opposite their post-operative identity. The cases are 
• Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court, 1 NZLR 603 (High Court of New Zealand 1991)
• Vecchione v Vecchione, Civ No 96D003769, reported in L.A. Daily J., Nov. 26, 1997 at 1 
(California)
• Re Kevin: Validity of Marriage of Transsexual, 165 Fed L Rep (Family Court of Australia 2001), 
(online at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2001/html/rekevin_text.html, last visited April 23, 
2004), upheld In the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia at Sydney, Appeal No. EA 
97/2001, File No. 8136/1999, 21 February 2003 (online at 
http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2003/pdf/attorney.pdf last visited on April 23, 2004) 
(Australia)
• Kantaras v Kantaras, Florida Case No: 98-537CA 51998DR005375xxxWS, Circuit (Court of the 
Sixth Judicial Circuit in and for Pasco County, February 23, 2003 (online at 
http://www.nclrights.org/cases/pdf/kantarasopinion.pdf, last visited April 23, 2004) (Florida).
Vecchione is unreported and has not been consulted. In the other three cases the courts placed great 
emphasis on the realization that
• failure to recognize the post-operative transsexual in the post-operative sex
• in a regime only allowing opposite-sex marriage
• would leave the post-operative transsexual in a position to marry someone of the opposite birth 
sex (identical to the transsexual’s post-operative sex)
thereby giving the public the impression of a legal same-sex marriage! (Attorney General v Otahuhu 
Family Court, 1 NZLR at 607; Re Kevin 165 Fed L Rep at §304; Kantaras, slip op at 749.)
45
 [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, online at http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/c-v-c.htm, last visited on March 21, 2004.
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Justice Ormrod decided the case by posing the question whether April “is or is not a 
woman” following surgery.46 Reviewing the expert medical testimony Justice Ormrod
declared
All the medical witnesses accept that there are, at least, four criteria for assessing 
the sexual condition of an individual.  These are-
(i) Chromosomal factors.
(ii) Gonadal factors (ie presence or absence of testes or ovaries).
(iii) Genital factors (including internal sex organs).
(iv) Psychological factors.
Some of the witnesses would add-
(v) Hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as 
distribution of hair, breast development, physique etc which are thought to 
reflect the balance between the male and female sex hormones in the 
body).47
Justice Ormrod continued
It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual 
constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, 
either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or 
surgical means.  The respondent's operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex.
The only cases where the term “change of sex” is appropriate are those in which a 
mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical 
investigation.48
Justice Ormrod realized that a person’s sex is irrelevant in many areas of the law such as 
“contractual or tortuous rights and obligations, and to the greater part of the criminal 
law”49 and relevant but not essential to other areas of the law such as employment law 
and national insurance. In contrast
sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage, because 
it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman.  It is the 
institution on which the family is built, and in which the capacity for natural 
heterosexual intercourse is an essential element.50
Justice Ormrod’s opinion reached its climax when he declared
Having regard to the essentially heterosexual character of the relationship which 
is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment, be biological, for even the 
most extreme degree of transsexualism in a male [i.e. (iv) psychological factors] 
46
 Id at 47.
47
 Id at 44.
48
 Id at 46.
49
 Id at 47.
50
 Id. (emphasis added)
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or the most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist in a person with male 
chromosomes, male gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is 
naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In 
other words, the law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors' 
criteria, i.e. the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and, if all three are 
congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore 
any operative intervention.51
There can be little doubt what Justice Ormrod meant by “performing the essential role of 
a woman in marriage.” As we will see later, a long chain of cases had held that 
reproductive capability is not required in marriage. On the other hand, these cases attest 
to the requirement of vera copula, that is “true and perfect coition.” Obviously, Justice 
Ormrod is referring to the fact that April’s vagina was entirely constructed and in no part 
natural. For Justice Ormrod, having a vagina – the receptacle for receiving a penis -  is 
the essential role of a woman in marriage. April fell short of being a woman since she 
lacked any natural capability for this.52
According to Justice Ormrod’s opinion feeling like a woman plays no legal role in being
either a woman or a wife. His opinion had banished “psychological factors.” Feeling like 
a woman is entirely optional for a wife!
After finding April Ashley not to be a woman following her surgery Justice Ormrod 
recognized that uncharted territory still lay ahead.
The real difficulties, of course, will occur if these three criteria [chromosomes, 
gonads, and genitals] are not congruent.  This question does not arise in the 
present case and I must not anticipate, but it would seem to me to follow from 
what I have said that greater weight would probably be given to the genital 
criteria than to the other two.  This problem and, in particular, the question of the 
effect of surgical operations in such cases of physical inter-sex, must be left until 
it comes for decision.53
B. The Introduction of the Psychological Factor (M.T. v J.T.  New Jersey, 1976)
Divorce court was also the setting for the first American case to consider the question of 
“how to tell the sex of a person for marital purposes.”54 In this New Jersey case the 
husband (J.T.) paid for his wife’s (M.T.) sex reassignment surgery prior to their marriage. 
After two years of living as husband and wife and having intercourse he decided that he 
51
 Id. (emphasis added)
52
 In the case of S v S (otherwise W), [1962] 3 All E.R. 55 an English court held that surgical enlargement 
of even the shortest vagina rendered this physical incapacity curable rather than incurable thereby 
precluding the possibility of annulling the marriage on the grounds of incurable physical incapacity, 
provided, of course, that the wife is a woman. Consequently, Justice Ormrod had to find April Ashley to be 
“not a woman” and someone without any natural capacity for receiving a penis in a vagina.
53 Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. at 48.
54 M.T. v. J.T., 140 NJ Super 77; 335 A2d 204 (1976)
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wanted no more of the marriage and walked out on her. When she sued for support he 
responded that she was a man, thereby making their marriage void.
In an extraordinarily humane opinion the trial judge wrote of the wife.
Are we to look upon this person as an exhibit in a circus side show?55
and denied the husband’s petition for an annulment. An appellate court affirmed the 
decision.
Judge Handler’s appellate court opinion directly addressed its disagreement with Justice 
Ormrod’s decision in Corbett.
Our departure from the Corbett thesis is not a matter of semantics. It stems from a 
fundamentally different understanding of what is meant by “sex” for marital 
purposes. The English court apparently felt that sex and gender were disparate 
phenomena. In a given case there may, of course, be such a difference. A 
preoperative transsexual is an example of that kind of disharmony, and most 
experts would be satisfied that the individual should be classified according to 
biological criteria. The evidence and authority which we have examined, 
however, show that a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, 
that is, one's self-image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual 
identity and character. Indeed, it has been observed that the “psychological sex of 
an individual,” while not serviceable for all purposes, is “practical, realistic and 
humane.” 56
For Judge Handler, unlike Justice Ormrod, feeling like a woman plays an important legal 
role in being a woman and a wife.
Sexual capacity or sexuality in this frame of reference requires the coalescence of 
both the physical ability and the psychological and emotional orientation to 
engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or a female.57
He concluded that
Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of 
sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and 
anatomy. Consequently, plaintiff should be considered a member of the female 
sex for marital purposes. 58
55
 Quoted id A2d at 207.
56
 Id at 209.
57
 Id.
58
 Id at 211.
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Statute law in 23 states59 and the District of Columbia specifically allows post-operative 
transsexuals to change their birth certificates.
C. Texas, Where Men are Men, Women are Women, and Only Chromosomes Matter 
(Littleton v Prange, 1999)
Texas and Kansas are not among them. Courts in these states have held that post-
operative transsexuals have not changed their sex and, therefore, their marriages to 
persons of the same anatomical birth sex were void ab initio.
Christie Lee Cavazos married Jonathan Littleton in 1989. In the early 1990s while 
Jonathan was hospitalized, unemployed, and unable to make his child support payments 
(to children from a previous marriage) the state of Texas, a community property state, 
compelled his wife Christie to make them.60 After Jonathan died in 1996 Christie brought 
a wrongful death suit against a Dr. Prange. During the discovery phase of the suit Dr. 
Prange’s attorney learned that Christie had been born Lee Cavazos and had sex 
reassignment surgery prior to her marriage to Jonathan. The attorney moved to have the 
suit dismissed on the grounds that since Christie was still a man she could not be 
Jonathan’s surviving spouse. As someone unrelated to Jonathan, Christie would have no 
standing to sue.
In a 2-1 decision the 4th Texas Court of Appeals upheld a trial court ruling that 
invalidated the Littleton’s marriage.61 Chief Justice  Hardberger’s majority opinion 
reflects a much blunter understanding of the issues than Justice Ormrod’s opinion in the 
Corbett case.
Chief Justice Hardberger’s opinion opens with a popular statement of the issue in front of 
the court
This case involves the most basic of questions. When is a man a man, and when is 
a woman a woman? Every schoolchild, even of tender years, is confident he or 
59
 Illinois was the first state to adopt such a statute (no later than 1967. Now 410 ILCS 535/17 (2003)) (See 
John P. Holloway, Transsexuals – Their Legal Sex, 40 U Colo L Rev 282, 288 (1968)) Alabama: Ala Code 
§ 22-9A-19(d) (2003). Arizona: Ariz Rev Stat § 36-326 (2003). Arkansas: Ark Code Ann § 20-18-307 
(2003). California: Cal Health hand Safety Code 103425 (West 2003). Colorado: Colo Rev Stat § 25-2-
115(4) (2003). Connecticut: Gen Stat Conn § 368a-19a-42 (2003). District of Columbia: DC Code Ann § 7-
217. Georgia: Ga Code Ann § 31-10-23(e) (West 2003). Hawaii: Hawaii Rev Stat § 338-17.7(4)(B) (2003). 
Kentucky: Ky Rev Stat Ann § 213.121(5) (Michie 2003). Louisiana: La Rev Stat Ann § 40.62(A),(C) West 
2003). Maryland:  Md Health Code Ann § 4-214(5) (2003). Massachusetts: Mass Gen Laws ch 36 § 13-5(e) 
(2003). Michigan: Mich Stat Ann § 333-2831(c) (Law Co-op 2003). Missouri: Mo Rev Stat § 193.215.9 
(2003). Nebraska: Neb Rev Stat § 71-604.01 (2003). New Jersey: NJ Rev Stat § 26:8-40.12 (2003). New 
Mexico: NM Stat Ann § 24-14-25(D) (2003). North Carolina: NC Gen Stat § 130a-18(b)(4) (2003). 
Oregon: Or Rev Stat § 432.235(4) (2003). Utah: Utah Code Ann § 26-2-11 (2003). Virginia: Va Stat Ann § 
32.1-269(E) (Michie 2003). Wisconsin: Wis Stat § 69.15(4)(b) (2003). Tennessee is the only state that 
expressly forbids changing sex on a birth certificate. (Tenn Code Ann § 68-3-203(d) (2003))
60
 Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 2, 2000).
61 Littleton v Prange, 9 SW3d 223 (1999) online at 
http://www.4thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/HTMLOpinion.asp?OpinionID=8210, last visited on March 
21, 2004.
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she can tell the difference, especially if the person is wearing no clothes. . . . The 
deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician change the 
gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender 
immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?62
After presenting the relevant facts in the case the opinion presents a refined statement of 
“The Legal Issue.”
Can there be a valid marriage between a man and a person born as a man, but 
surgically altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman? . . . This court, 
as did the trial court below, must answer this question: Is Christie a man or a 
woman?63
In her brief dissent Justice Lopez noted that “neither federal nor state law defines how a 
person's gender is to be determined.”64 The majority opinion did not dispute this fact. 
After reviewing relevant precedents such as Corbett and M.T. v J.T. Justice Hardberger
wrote that
In our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to 
determine what guidelines should govern the regulation of marriages involving 
transsexuals.65
In spite of a long legal tradition presuming the validity of marriages not clearly prohibited 
by law,66 Chief Justice Hardberger proceeded to provide just such a set of guidelines. He 
62
 Id.
63
 Id at 225.
64
 Id at 232 (Lopez dissenting).
65
 Id at 230 (majority).
66
 “The policy of the law is to sustain marriages, where they are not incestuous, polygamous, shocking to 
good morals, unalterably opposed to a well defined public policy, or prohibited.” (Mazzolini v Mazzolini, 
168 Ohio St 357,358, 155 NE 2d 206,207 (1958).) In this case Edward Mazzolini, a 58 year old widower 
who was a long time resident of Ohio, went to Massachusetts to marry Josephine Mazzolini, his 51 year old 
first cousin. 
[They] were ostensibly married ceremonially in the Roman Catholic Church in Massachusetts . . . 
with the permission of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston. They then moved to Edward's 
home in Ohio to live. Both were at all times cognizant of their blood relationship and disclosed it 
to the church and civil authorities. (Id at NE 2d 207)
When the marriage failed Josephine moved back to Massachusetts. Edward sought to have the marriage 
annulled in the Ohio courts. At that time Ohio law did not allow first cousins to “be joined in marriage.” (It 
still doesn’t. See  Ohio Rev Code Ann § 3101.01 (Anderson 2003).)  Moreover, then as now Massachusetts 
law stated that
No marriage shall be contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and intending to continue to 
reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, 
and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in violation hereof shall be null and void. (Id at 
208 quoting Mass Gen Laws Chapter 207, § 11.)
Edward failed to win an annulment. The Ohio Supreme Court held (by a 4-3 vote)
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rejected the notion that Christie could change her complement of sexual organs from 
male to female.
(4) Through surgery and hormones, a transsexual male can be made to look like a 
woman, including female genitalia and breasts. Transsexual medical treatment, 
however, does not create the internal sexual organs of a woman (except for the 
vaginal canal). There is no womb, cervix or ovaries in the post-operative female.67
At most, Christie could have her male organs removed and an artificial vagina created. 
Seeking some constant factor underlying the change, Chief Justice Hardberger’s opined.
(5) The male chromosomes do not change with either hormonal treatment or sex 
reassignment surgery. Biologically a post-operative female is still a male.68
No doubt he thought that (a) there are only two types of sex chromosome pairs and (b) 
sex chromosomes determine sexual anatomical characteristics unambiguously and 
without exception. Of course, he was wrong on both counts, as he could have learned 
from a visit to the nearby University of Texas Medical Center at San Antonio.69 In any 
But since the statutes of Ohio do not expressly declare that a first-cousin marriage is void ab initio 
and since sexual relations between cousins, which would certainly include first cousins, are not 
incestuous, we are persuaded to adopt, in the instant case, the position, represented by the trend of 
the more modern cases and in accord with the general rule, 'that a marriage between persons of a 
class that the statute simply says shall not marry * * * is not void, in the absence of a declaration 
in the statute that such marriage is void.' (Mazzolini, 155 NE 2d at 208-209.)
67 Littleton, 9 SW3d at 230.
68
 Id.
69
 Chief Justice Hardberger et al would do well to pay attention the case of a child born in the Dallas area in 
early 2002.
A 17-day-old black neonate presented with ambiguous genitalia. A sharp line separated 
hypopigmented [mottled] skin on the left side of the abdomen from normally pigmented skin on 
the right side. A pendulous, wrinkled labioscrotal fold contained a gonad on the right side. In 
contrast, the hypoplastic, flat, left side was empty. A palpable left inguinal mass could not be 
clearly characterized with the use of ultrasonography. The phallus was 3 cm in length, with 
perineal hypospadias [urthrethral opening on the perineum] and 30-degree chordee. [Chordee is a 
congenital downward curvature of the penis due to a strand of connective tissue between the 
urethral opening and the glands.] Testing revealed 46,XX/46,XY mosaicism and normal levels of 
male hormones. [One wonders about the levels of female hormones.] Laparoscopic surgery was 
performed; on the left side a hemiuterus, a fallopian tube, fimbriae, and an ovary were found and 
resected. These structures were absent on the right side. A normal vas exited the right internal 
ring, leading to a well formed epididymis and a scrotal, biopsy-proven ovotestis with dotted 
islands of ovarian tissue capping the lower pole of the testicle. The ovarian tissue was removed, 
and left inguinal herniorraphy, placement of a left testicular prosthesis, and repair of the 
hypospadias were subsequently completed. At 21 months, the child has an excellent cosmetic 
result. (Jose A. Karam, M.D. and Linda A. Baker, M.D., True Hermaphroditism, 350 N Eng J 
Med 393 (January 22, 2004).)
Drs. Karam and Baker are on the staff of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas. 
This child has to live with the rulings of Texas courts.
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case Chief Justice Hardberger’s criterion is hardly a criterion that any schoolchild would 
be able to employ unless the schoolchild had access to sophisticated laboratory 
equipment. Never mind the naked body of his opening remark, the criterion is not 
available to the naked eye.
More importantly, Chief Justice Hardberger’s opinion relies on just a single factor: the 
sex chromosomes. Consequently, this opinion unwittingly leaves unsettled only those 
cases in which a person has atypical sex chromosomes. Hardberger’s coarse grained 
analysis settles cases anticipated by Justice Ormrod in which chromosomes, gonads, and 
genitals are not present in typical alignment with all the subtlety of a twenty ton weight. 
According to this opinion gonads and genitals play no part in determining one’s legal sex. 
Physically intersexed persons with either XX or XY chromosomes are simply the sex of 
their sex chromosomes according to this opinion. Their sex role from birth, even if it is 
the one on their birth certificate does not matter if someone finds out what sex 
chromosomes they have.
Chief Justice Hardberger’s opinion concluded.
We hold, as a matter of law, that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie 
cannot be married to another male.70
By ruling Christie Littleton to be “a male”, rather than “not a female” as Justice Ormrod 
had decided, Chief Justice Hardberger gave Christie legal blessing to marry any female 
she pleased provided, of course, that the other female has XX sex chromosomes! 
Although this was of no interest to Christie, some post-operative male-to-female 
transsexuals have sought to take advantage of this ruling to marry the woman they love in 
Texas.71 Not surprisingly, they have run into resistance.72
D. What Gametes Do You Make? As a Matter of Fact, It’s a Matter of Law (In re Estate 
of Gardiner, Kansas, 2001/2)
Kansas law states:
The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract between two 
parties who are of opposite sex. All other marriages are declared to be contrary to 
the public policy of this state and are void.73
70
 Id.
71
 In September 2000, Robin Wicks married Jessica Wicks. Robin, a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual, was born Grady Roland Wicks. See Polly Ross Hughes, Lesbians Plans to Wed Look Legal 
Bexar County Ruling Could Pave Way for Trip Down Aisle”, Houston Chronicle Aug 30, 2000, online at 
http://christielee.net/same2.html last visited April 1, 2004.
72
 "’Remember Sodom and Gomorrah,’ said one sign, carried by a protester. ‘This is wrong and it needs to 
change. The homosexuals are saying it's a same-sex wedding but it's not that at all. It is a hoax on their 
part,’ said Jack M. Finger.” John W. Gonzalez, “Lesbians Legally Exchange Vows – Marriage of Same-
Sex Couple from Houston a First for Texas”, Houston Chronicle Sept. 17, 2000 online at 
http://christielee.net/same14.html last visited April 1, 2004.
73
 Kan Stat Ann § 23-101-1 (2002).
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J’Noel Gardiner was born in Wisconsin as Jay N. Ball with a male body.74 As Jay N. Ball 
he took “S. P.” as his lawfully wedded wife.75 Their divorce became final in May 199476. 
Later that year, after J’Noel completed a series of sex reassignment surgeries, she had her 
name and sex amended on her birth certificate as specifically allowed by Wisconsin 
statute law.77 In May 1998 J’Noel met Marshall Gardiner a well-to-do Kansan who had a 
son from a previous marriage. J’Noel and Marshall married in Kansas in September 
1998.78 A year later Marshall died without a will, leaving an estate worth over 2 million 
dollars.
Marshall’s son Joe went to court to have himself declared the sole heir and administrator 
of his father’s estate. When J’Noel sued for her rights as the surviving spouse Joe 
responded that J’Noel had no standing since there had never been a valid marriage. Joe’s 
attorneys asserted that J’Noel was still a man. Joe won the first round of litigation when 
the district court, citing the Littleton decision and its emphasis on chromosomes, held that 
J’Noel was born and remained a male. J’Noel appealed.
The Appeals court rejected the lower court’s reliance on the coarse grained, 
chromosomes only approach of Littleton. The Appeals court recognized the uncommon 
nature of the case when it wrote.
Some cases lend themselves to precise definitions, categories, and classifications. 
On occasion, issues or individuals come before a court which do not fit into a 
bilateral set of classifications. Questions of this nature highlight the tension which 
sometimes exists between the legal system, on the one hand, and the medical and 
scientific communities, on the other.79
The opinion excerpted 14 pages from Professor Greenberg’s 1999 Article outlining the 
wide variety of atypical combinations of sexual characteristics and how they can arise. 
Recognizing this diversity of developmental factors and outcomes the Appeals court 
ordered that a trial court decide whether J’Noel was a male or female at the time she 
married Marshall, not simply what her chromosomes were at birth and throughout her 
life. It ordered the trial court to employ at least all of the 8 factors listed by Professor 
Greenberg. In so doing the Appeals court framed the legal question as follows “The 
question here is whether J'Noel should have been considered a female under Kansas law 
at the time the marriage license was issued.”80
74 In re Estate of Gardiner, 29 Kan App 2d 92, 22 P3d 1086,1090 (2001) online at 
http://www.kscourts.org/kscases/ctapp/2001/20010511/85030.htm, last visited on March 21, 2004. 
(Hereinafter Gardiner Appeals.)
75 In re Estate of Gardiner, 273 Kan 194, 42 P3d 120,123 (2002) online at 
http://www.kscourts.org/kscases/supct/2002/20020315/85030.htm, last visited on March 21, 2004. 
(Hereinafter Gardiner Supreme.)
76
 Id.
77 Gardiner Appeals, 22 P3d at 1091. The statute is Wis Stat § 69.15(4)(b) (2002).
78 Gardiner Appeals, 22 P3d at 1091.
79
 Id at 1090.
80
 Id at 1092.
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The Appeals Court also had the vision to see that more was at stake even if chromosomes 
are legally the only factor that matters.
If one concludes that chromosomes are all that matter and that a person born 
with “male” chromosomes is and evermore shall be male, then one must confront 
every situation which does not conform with such a rigid framework of 
thought. There are situations of ambiguity in which certain individuals have 
chromosomes that differ from the typical pattern. The questions which must be 
asked, if not answered, are: “Are these people male or female?” and, “Should 
they be allowed to get married?”81
This was the first time an American court raised the question of whether a transgendered 
person could marry anyone.
Joe appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision before the case could go to trial. Comparing 
the prior cases available to it the Kansas Supreme Court opined
the essential difference between the line of cases, including Corbett and Littleton, 
that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage and the line of cases, including M.T. 
and In re Kevin [an Australian case], that would validate it is that the former 
treats a person's sex as a matter of law and the latter treats a person's sex as a 
matter of fact.82
Citing the Kansas legislature’s silence on the marital rights of transsexuals the Kansas 
Supreme Court treated the problem as a matter of law rather than allowing a jury to treat 
the issue as a matter of fact. In so doing it adhered to longstanding legal precedent that 
words in statutes should be given their ordinary and everyday interpretation unless 
specifically defined otherwise by the statutes.
To find the ordinary and everyday meaning of “sex”, “male”, and “female” the Kansas 
Supreme Court turned to a 1999 Law Dictionary and an English language dictionary from 
1970!
The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” are words in common usage and 
understood by the general population. Black's Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th ed.1999) 
defines “sex” as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that 
distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of being male or 
female.” Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2nd ed.1970) states the 
initial definition of sex as “either of the two divisions of organisms distinguished 
as male or female; males or females (especially men or women) collectively.” 
“Male” is defined as “designating or of the sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets 
81
 Id at 1094.
82 Gardiner Supreme, 42 P3d at 132-133. (emphasis added)
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offspring: opposed to female.” “Female” is defined as “designating or of the sex 
that produces ova and bears offspring: opposed to male.”83
Given these three decade old definitions of “male” and “female” the Kansas Supreme 
Court easily found its way to rule
The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” in everyday understanding do not 
encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite 
sex" contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and not persons who 
are experiencing gender dysphoria. A male-to-female post-operative transsexual 
does not fit the definition of a female. The male organs have been removed, but 
the ability to "produce ova and bear offspring" does not and never did exist. There 
is no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes.84
Undoubtedly, the same analysis holds for female-to-male transsexuals who have had all 
of their female organs removed, have never had a prostate gland or testes, and are unable 
to produce sperm cells. In Kansas, male to female transsexuals remain male, presumably 
because they once had the ability to produce sperm cells. Recognizing that J’Noel once 
had male sex organs the opinion ends with a declaration that “J’Noel remains a 
transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage.” 85
83
 Id P3d at 135.
84
 Id. (emphasis added)
85
 Id at 137. Commenting on the district court’s decision in Gardiner, Shana Brown, has suggested that “the 
Kansas court's ruling essentially leaves J'Noel without the right to enter into any marriage that would be 
recognized across state lines. She cannot marry a man in Kansas, and she cannot marry a woman in 
Wisconsin.” (Sex Changes and “Opposite Sex” Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
Compel Recognition of Transgendered Persons' Amended Legal Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 San Diego L 
Rev 1118 (2001)) Of course, the same holds for the Kansas Supreme Court’s ruling and the ruling of the 
Littleton court in Texas.
Brown’s assertion blurs the distinction between getting a marriage license to get married and staying 
married. There are cases of post-operative male-to-female transsexuals remaining married to their wives 
after surgery. Although these couples could not get a marriage license to get married as members of the 
same sex, their marriages have not been challenged, even in New Jersey, the one state with an appellate 
court ruling upholding the validity of a marriage between a male-to-female transsexual and her husband.
Nevertheless, it is almost certain that Joe Gardiner and Dr. Prange would have brought legal action to have 
the Gardiner and Littleton marriages ruled void ab initio even if the marriages had been performed in New 
Jersey and the couples had resided there prior to returning to Kansas and Texas respectively. We cannot be 
certain how the Kansas and Texas courts would have ruled, or, if the couples had merely gone to Atlantic 
City to get married and then immediately returned to their home states.
In the absence of any rulings Brown’s point is well taken that couples such as the Gardiners and the 
Littletons should not have to live under the threat that they might have to defend the validity of their 
marriages in a court of law.
The flip side of Brown’s suggestion is that transsexuals do have a limited “universal” marriage right, the 
right to marry a partner, regardless of the partner’s legal sex. The universal marriage right is constrained by 
the willingness to choose a residence with the appropriate case law. Under current case law a post-operative 
male-to-female transsexual, for example, can marry a legal male in New Jersey, California, and Florida and 
a post-operative male-to-female transsexual can marry a legal female in Texas and Kansas!
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E. Neither of the Above: The Law Confronts Physical Intersexuality (In the Marriage of 
C. and D., Australia, 1979)
Many opponents of universal marriage argue that it is certain to lead to the end of 
civilization as we know it. In such an environment will it be any surprise if this faction 
next proposes that transsexuals forfeit the right to marry? (Some medical institutions 
providing sex reassignment surgery have required married candidates to get a divorce 
prior to commencing treatment.)
In the current political and moral climate many opponents of universal marriage describe 
same-sex attraction as “objectively disordered.”86 One can only wonder what views they 
have on transsexuals. Indeed, in the first American case dealing with a transsexual in 
1966, Anonymous v Weiner, a New York judge refused to change the sex on a 
transsexual’s birth certificate citing the advice of the New York Academy of Medicine.
It is questionable whether laws and records such as the birth certificate should be 
changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill persons in their 
social adaptation.87
Given today’s contentious state of affairs I doubt that any argument depending on the 
plight of transsexuals will carry much weight with traditionalists or cause them to 
question their conceptual schemes.88
Therefore, I want to shift the argument to the plight of the physically intersexed, 
historically called “hermaphrodites”, persons born with atypical sexual anatomies 
combining female and male characteristics. No “disordered” state of mind caused them to 
be born this way, just as no “ordered” state of mind caused anyone to be born with a 
typical sexual anatomy.
We have seen that
• In Corbett an English court held that a post-operative male-to-female transsexual 
is not a woman. Therefore, she cannot marry a man. It left unresolved the 
question of marriage to a woman.
86
 “[T]he inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.” Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons,” October, 
1, 1986, §3, online at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19861001_homose
xual-persons_en.html, last visited April 26, 2004.
87 Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 NYS2d 319,322, 50 Misc2d 380,382 (1966). (emphasis added) In the context 
of a prisoner’s rights case Judge Richard Posner recently wrote “Someone eager to undergo this mutilation 
is plainly suffering from a profound psychiatric disorder.” Maggert v Hanks, 131 F3d 670,671 (1997)
88
 “To put it plainly, transssexualism constitutes a perpetual obex [impediment] to marriage because it is a 
radical, serious and incurable psychological disorder.” Graham, 41 The Jurist at 141. (“The Jurist is the 
only journal published in the United States devoted to the study and promotion of canon law.”)
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• In M.T. v J.T. a New Jersey court held that a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual is a woman. Therefore, she can marry a man (but not a woman.)
• In Littleton and Gardiner Texas and Kansas courts held that a post-operative 
male-to-female transsexual is a man and not a woman. In Texas because she still 
has XY chromosomes. In Kansas because of the gonads she used to have and the 
ones she never had. Therefore, marriage to a man is allowed but not marriage to a 
woman.
In 1979 English speaking jurisprudence reached the previously uncharted territory of the 
physically intersexed predicted by Justice Ormrod. In that year an Australian court 
declared In the Marriage of C. and D. (Falsely Called C)89 that a marriage between a 
physically intersexed husband and his wife was void ab initio since the husband was not 
a man. By a stroke of good fortune his medical history had been published in 1966.90
At birth the husband’s parents were told that he was a male with a gross phallic deformity 
that could not be corrected until he was 16. When he reached age 16 he had become 
accustomed to his genital details and did not seek surgery. He sought local medical help 
when he began to experience bouts of periodic abdominal pain accompanied by slight 
bleeding through his urethral opening “far back on the scrotum.”91 The gonad on the left 
side of his scrotum had always been apparent. A laparotomy revealed a Fallopian tube 
and a “right-sided gonad” on the right side but not the left side of his body. The 
examination also revealed a 2 inch long uterus.92 The periodic bleeding stopped after 
removal of the Fallopian tube and gonad.
A year later he had a double mastectomy to remove his “well-formed” breasts which had
embarrassed him by drawing the unwanted attention of his colleagues at work.93 Within 
two years “he became enamoured of an attractive girl” and sought surgery to have his 
external genitals made “reasonably normal.”94
The medical team analyzed the gonad that had been removed 3 years earlier and found 
that it was neither an ovary nor a testis but a true ovo-testis. “Intimately associated with 
ovarian structures were testicular components.”95 They did not analyze the remaining 
gonad on the left side of the scrotum. Analysis of 6 hormones usually correlated with sex 
were inconclusive. All were within normal range for a male or a female except for 
testosterone which was low for a male and 17-ketosteroid which was high for a female.96
Only the chromosome tests were unambiguous. All 20 cells examined in detail showed an 
XX chromosomal pattern “indistinguishable from that of a normal female.”97
89 C. and D. 35 Fed L Rep 340 (1979).
90
 Kenneth Fraser, M. J. J. O’Reilly, J. R. Rintoul, Hermaphroditus Verus, with Report of a Case, [1966] 1 
Med J Australia 1003.
91
 Id at 1004.
92
 Id.
93
 Id.
94
 Id.
95
 Id at 1005.
96
 Id at 1006.
97
 Id at 1005.
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In spite of this one unambiguous marker the physicians had no doubt of their course of 
action.
The presence of both testicular and ovarian tissue clearly indicated that this was a 
case of true hermaphroditism. In spite of the bisexual gonadal structure, the 
female chromosomal arrangement, the female internal genitalia, and the equivocal 
results of  the hormonal assays, there was no doubt, in view of the assigned male 
sex, the male psychosexual orientation in a person of  this age and the possibility 
of converting his external genitals into an acceptable male pattern, that he should 
continue in the sex in which he had been reared.98
The medical team performed surgeries in 1964-5 to make the external genitals 
“reasonably normal” and concluded “He is happily engaged, and is shortly to marry the 
girl with whom he was in love before his surgery was commenced.”99 C. married D. in 
February 1967. They did not live happily ever after.
They had two children by the time they separated in 1978. In early 1970 they adopted a 
child and in late 1973 she gave birth to a child who was legally though not biologically 
his. (There is no discussion concerning the circumstances of conception.) During the 
legal proceedings in front of Justice Bell the husband did not dispute that they had not 
consummated their marriage
Justice Bell’s opinion should stand out as evidence that “activist” judges do not sit on 
only one side of the marriage wars. Citing the relevant Australian statute that
the consent of the parties is not a real consent because –
(ii) that party is mistaken as to the identity of the other party, or as to the nature of 
the ceremony performed.100
Justice Bell continued
“The ground of identity is in my opinion made out in that the wife was 
contemplating immediately prior to marriage and did in fact believe that she was 
marrying, a male. She did not in fact marry a male but a combination of both male 
and female and notwithstanding that the husband exhibited as a male, he was in 
fact not and the wife was mistaken as to the identity of her husband.”101
Had Justice Bell stopped at declaring void just this particular marriage the husband C.
would have presumably been able to marry another woman who knew his identity (i.e. 
his  medical history.)
98
 Id at 1006.
99
 Id.
100 C. and D., 35 Fed L Rep at 344. (emphasis added)
101
 Id.
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Finding “a further fatal argument to the existence of any marriage”102 Justice Bell did not 
stop there. He suggested without citations that “subsequent medical practice appears to 
cast some doubts upon this [i.e., the medical procedures undertaken a decade earlier].”103
Without considering the fact that the husband C. actually had had to live with his own 
medical autobiography “exhibit[ing] as a male in two of the three criteria”104 and as a 
female in the third criterion, Justice Bell ruled that the physically intersexed husband was 
not a man and could not possibly be a husband at all. 
…in s. 46(1) of the Marriage Act, the following words are used: “Marriage, 
according to the law of Australia, is the union of a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of all others.” . . . I have no hesitation in saying that the definition of 
“marriage” as understood in Christendom is the voluntary union of one man and 
one woman . . . I am satisfied on the evidence that the husband was neither man 
nor woman but was a combination of both, and a marriage in the true sense of 
the word as within the definition referred to above could not have taken place 
and did not exist.105
Justice Bell’s ruling denied C. the right to marry anyone! Four centuries earlier Marin le 
Marcis only had to wait four years before he could marry.
Will the defenders of the traditional view of marriage deny the physically intersexed the 
right to marry without surgery or even after surgery? If the 14th Amendment tells us 
anything, it tells us that in America no one is denied their basic civil rights by virtue of 
the accidents of their birth.106 As the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v Casey (1992).
The analysis does not end with the one percent . . . upon whom the statute 
operates; it begins there. . . . The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the 
group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is 
irrelevant.107
The decision in C. and D. highlights the fact that the proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment guarantees no universal right to anyone. It merely taketh away. It taketh 
away the right of states to decide for themselves. It taketh away the right of gays and 
lesbians to marry the persons they love. If C. and D. were an American case it taketh 
away C.’s right to marry anyone. In the absence of the Federal Marriage Amendment C. 
102
 Id. (emphasis added)
103
 Id at 345.
104
 Id at 344.
105
 Id at 345. (emphasis added)
106
 See Levy v Louisiana, 391 US 68 (1968) invalidating a Louisiana law denying illegitimate children the 
right to sue for the wrongful death of their mother; Weber v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 US 164 
(1972) invalidating a Louisiana law denying illegitimate children the same rights to workmen’s 
compensation as legitimate children; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535 (1973) invalidating a Texas law denying 
illegitimate children the same right to support from their natural father as is enjoyed by legitimate children; 
and Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977) invalidating an Illinois law denying illegitimate children the 
right to intestate succession from their fathers.
107
 505 US 833,894 (1992). (emphasis added)
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could hope to bring an Equal Protection suit in the Federal courts to have himself at least 
declared to be a woman or a man for the sake of marriage eligibility. By not recognizing 
the right of everyone to marry someone, the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment 
taketh away even that. If C. were an American he would be the Dred Scott of the 
marriage wars.
IV. SEXUAL CONSUMMATION AND REPRODUCTION IN TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF MARRIAGE
Gerard V. Bradley, Professor of Law at Notre Dame and Robert P. George, the 
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University are two of the leading 
proponents of the new natural law. They argue that the reproductive sex act within the 
bonds of marriage of a woman and a man is the only morally valid form of sexual 
activity.
Although much in our culture has tended in recent years to undermine the 
institution of marriage and the moral understandings upon which it rests, 
longstanding features of our legal and religious traditions testify to the intrinsic 
value of marriage as a two-in-one-flesh communion. Consummation has 
traditionally (though, perhaps, not universally) been recognized by civil as well as 
religious authorities as an essential element of marriage. "Physical defects and 
incapacities which render a party unable to consummate the marriage, existing at 
the time of the marriage, and which are incurable are, under most statutes, 
grounds for annulment." . . . This requirement for the validity of a marriage, 
where in force, has never been treated as satisfied by an act of sodomy, no matter 
how pleasurable. Nothing less (or more) than an act of genital union consummates 
a marriage; and such an act consummates even if it is not particularly pleasurable. 
Unless otherwise impeded, couples who know they are sterile can lawfully marry 
so long as they are capable of consummating their marriage by performing such 
an act. By the same token, a marriage cannot be annulled for want of 
consummation on the ground that one of the spouses turned out to be sterile. A 
marriage can, however, be annulled on the ground that impotence (or some other 
condition) prevents the partners from consummating it.108 (footnotes and citations 
omitted)
In a nutshell they argue that even between wife and husband no form of sexual activity 
other than the reproductive sex act is valid since only the reproductive sex act unites a 
couple as two-in-one-flesh. Consequently, a couple anatomically unequipped for the 
reproductive sex act cannot marry. Of course, they have same-sex couples and same-sex 
marriage in mind but their strictures apply to our veteran of the war in Iraq who comes 
home after having stepped on a land mine and had his penis and testicles blown away.
Bradley and George are certainly correct that civil authority has traditionally recognized 
sexual consummation as an essential element of marriage. However, this merits closer 
examination. The passage just quoted cites a Georgia statute that reads 
108
 Gerard V. Bradley and Robert P. George, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 Georgetown L J 
301,307-308 (1995).
Michael L. Rosin Page 28 08/22/2004
To constitute a valid marriage in this state there must be: 
(1) Parties able to contract; 
(2) An actual contract; and
(3) Consummation according to law.109
The phrase “Consummation according to law” may appear to refer to sexual 
consummation, but in fact it does not.110 According to the Georgia Supreme Court 
“Sexual intercourse is not essential to the consummation of a valid marriage.“111 In 
Georgia “Consummation according to law” means cohabitation as man and wife.112
For over a century and a half the relevant standard in Georgia113 and elsewhere has been 
that a marriage can be annulled if the following 3 conditions all hold.
• It has not been sexually consummated,114
109
 Ga Code Ann §19-2-1 (1991) when Bradley and George published. Currently, Ga Code Ann §19-3-1 
(Michie 2003). This language dates back to the Georgia code of 1863. (See Lefkoff v Sicro, 189 Ga 
554,564, 6 SE2d 687,695 (1939).)
110
 This choice of words is confusing. Reading further in the Georgia code clarifies matter a bit. “The form 
for application for marriage licenses shall be designed and printed in such a manner that applicants therefor 
shall designate the surnames which will be used as their legal surnames after the marriage is 
consummated.” Ga Code Ann §19-3-33.1(a) (Michie 2003) Surely Georgia wives who choose to take their 
husband’s surname as their own do so as soon as the ceremony is celebrated and do not have to wait until 
they have sexually consummated their marriage! South Carolina’s statute is much clearer on this matter. “If 
any such [marriage] contract has not been consummated by the cohabitation of the parties thereto the court 
may declare such contract void for want of consent of either of the contracting parties or for any other 
cause going to show that, at the time the supposed contract was made, it was not a contract.” (SC Code Ann 
§20-1-530 (Law Co-op 2003).)
111 Long v Long, 191 Ga 606,607, 13 SE2d 349,350 (1941) In this case the wife sued the husband for 
divorce on grounds of cruelty after three weeks of cohabitation. The husband responded “that that since 
there was no sexual intercourse the marriage was not consummated, and accordingly there was in fact no 
marriage.” (Id.) The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding for the wife. For a similar 
statement about the validity of a marriage not depending on sexual intercourse see Franklin v Franklin, 154 
Mass 515,516 28 NE 681,682 (1891) “The consummation of a marriage by coition is not necessary to its 
validity.”
112 Brown v Brown, 234 Ga 300, 301, 215 SE2d 671, 673 (1975).
113
 “[T]hough the concubitus itself will not constitute marriage, yet it is so far one of the essential duties for 
which the parties stipulate, that the incapacity of either party to satisfy that duty nullifies the contract.” 
Askew v Dupree, 30 Ga 173,179 (1860) The case of S v S, 211 Ga 365, 86 So2d 103 (1955) ironically 
demonstrates that Georgia annulments depend on impotence and not simply the question of whether sexual 
relations have or have not occurred. In this case “the wife was capable of having sexual intercourse and 
becoming pregnant; there was no malformation in her genital organs; during the time they lived together 
they had sexual relations, but because of the paralyzed condition of the wife's muscles she experienced no 
feeling when the act was being performed.” 211 (Id SE2d at 104.) The husband claimed that his wife “was 
incapable during the act of intercourse of having an orgasm or crisis of sexual excitement” and “was at the 
time of the marriage, and is now, permanently incapable of performing the complete act of sexual 
intercourse.” (Id, emphasis added.) The trial court held for the wife. Recognizing that “'Upon a question of 
sexual intercourse the experience and sagacity of the jurors might very well be trusted to run the general 
logic of the case” (id at 105) the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict that, as a matter of fact, 
the wife was not impotent.
114
 Bradley and George also argue for the central role of sexual consummation by citing the following 
passage “an unconsummated marriage is little more than an engagement to marry.” (Bradley and George, 
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• due to a physical incapacity of one of the spouse at the time of the marriage,
• the incapacity is incurable.115
As of this writing 13 states116 have gone one step further and have statutes that 
specifically require that the other spouse be unaware of the physical incapacity when the 
marriage is celebrated.117 In these states the bride of our wounded war veteran would be 
legally incapable of suing for an annulment if she knew of her husband’s incapacity when 
they married. In no state is this couple prohibited from marrying. In these 13 states the 
marriage contract between this couple certainly does not include an implied commitment 
to reproductive sex acts. In these 13 states marriage is certainly not about sexual 
activity that is reproductive in kind!118
All of this suggests that there is more than one model for marriage. Reading back beyond 
a case cited by Bradley and George adds weight to this view.
A. The First American Case Reviewing Evidence of Physical Incapacity
84 Georgetown L J at 308 n23 citing Homer H. Clark, Jr, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United 
States 93 (West, 2d ed, 1988) quoting Akrep v Akrep, 1 NJ 268,270, 63 A2d 253,254 (1949). Akrep is a suit 
for annulment on the grounds of fraud. In this case the husband had promised the wife that they would have 
a religious ceremony after a civil ceremony. “After the civil ceremony the parties partook of a dinner and 
then parted. They remained separated.” (Id A2d at 253.) He reneged on his promise and the wife sued for 
an annulment. Here is the complete passage from Akrep that Clark truncated. “An unconsummated 
marriage is little more than an engagement to marry and where effected with fraud which would render a 
contract voidable, is voidable at the option of the injured party if promptly disaffirmed before any change 
of status has occurred.” (Id at 254.) The New Jersey Supreme Court continued. “As the public concern is 
diminished, so too is the quality and kind of the required fraud lessened in a non-consummated marriage 
and may, according to the authorities, be any fraud which would render a contract voidable”. (Id.)
115
 52 Am Jur 2d Annulment of Marriage §§27-29 (2003).
116
 Colorado: Colo Rev Stat § 14-10-111(b) (2003). Delaware: 13:15 Dela Code Ann § 1506(2) (2003).
Hawaii: Hawaii Rev Stat § 580-28 (2003). Illinois: 750 ILCS 5/301(2) (2003). Kentucky: Ky Rev Stat Ann 
§ 403-120.(1).b (Banks-Baldwin 2003). Minnesota: Minn Stat § 518-02(b) (2003). Mississippi: Miss Code 
§ 93-7-3(a) (2003). Montana: Mont Code Ann § 40-1-402(1)(b) (2003). New Jersey: NJ Rev Stat § 2A:34-
1(c) (2003). Pennsylvania: 23 Pa Cons Stat § 3305(a)4 (2003). Texas: Tex Family Code Ann § 6.106(1) 
(2003). West Virginia: W Va Code §48-3-103(a)(3)(C) (2003). Wisconsin: Wis Stat § 767.03(2) (2003). 
Delaware’s statute dates back to 1907. (See S. v S., 42 Del 192,196, 29 A2d 325,326 (New Castle County 
Sup Ct 1942).)
117
 The doctrine that awareness of the other spouse’s physical incapacity bars a suit for annulment on the 
grounds of physical incapacity goes back at least as far as John Ayliffe’s Parergon juris canonici anglicani
(1726).
The husband may pray a separation of matrimony on the account of a matrimonial impediment, 
though such impediment proceeds and arises from himself; as from his own impotency and 
frigidity; but if he knowingly marries a woman that cannot render him his due, he is 
(notwithstanding) bound to maintain her, and shall not be divorced from her; for he ought to 
impute it to himself. (John Ayliffe, Parergon juris canonici anglicani 230 (D. Leach 1726) 
emphasis added.)
118
 Minnesota, Mississippi, and Montana had criminal sodomy laws in their statute books until the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of criminal sodomy laws in Lawrence v Texas (___ US ___ (2003).   ). Thus, prior to 
Lawrence these three states allowed opposite sex couples to marry who were physically incapable of 
engaging in any orificial sex acts that were legal. (See Minn Stat § 609.293 (2003); Miss Code § 93-29-59
(2003); Mont Code Ann § 45-5-505(1) (2003).)
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Bradley and George cite J.G. v H.G., a Maryland case from 1870, to bolster their 
argument.119 This is the first American case to review evidence presented for physical 
incapacity.120 J.G., the husband, was 49 when he married H.G. in 1864. She was 28. 
Within 3 months of their wedding they separated, having been unable to consummate 
their marriage due to a physical impediment of hers. At that time Maryland law allowed 
for an annulment in case  of "the impotence of either party at the time of the marriage."121
Six years later in 1870 the husband brought a suit for annulment. In his finding of fact 
Judge Bartol wrote
The physical condition of the appellee [wife], at the time of the marriage, was that 
of a very imperfect development of the sexual organs, both externally and 
internally. These organs were in a rudimentary condition, evincing that their 
development had ceased and been arrested before the age of puberty. She had 
never experienced the monthly sickness to which females of mature age are 
subject; and was without the natural passion or desire incident to woman.122
Based on these findings Judge Bartol concluded
The rudimentary condition of her sexual organs, and their imperfect development, 
not only rendered conception impossible, but there was on her part an incapacity 
for vera copula. That is to say, she was not capable of the act of generation in its 
natural and ordinary meaning, but only of incipient and imperfect coition.
In giving the results of their examination, the surgeons differ somewhat as to the 
degree or extent of the organic defects; but we have stated the conclusions which 
appear to us to be established by their testimony. They all concur in saying that 
the defect is incurable.
 Whatever differences of opinion may have arisen as to the legal definition of 
impotence, it is well settled that if by reason of malformation or organic defect 
existing at the time of the marriage, there cannot be natural and perfect coition, 
vera copula, between the parties; and it appears that the defect is permanent 
119
 Bradley and George, 84 Georgetown L J at 309 n27.
120 J.G. v H.G., 33 Md 401 (1870). This case cites two previous New York Chancery cases (Devanbagh v 
Devanbagh, 5 Paige 554 (1836); and Newell v Newell, 9 Paige 25 (1841)) that established the rule that 
medical practitioners must present testimony on physical incapacity before an annulment can be granted. In 
a slightly earlier case the Ohio Supreme Court granted a divorce in the case of a husband lacking a penis. 
(Keith v Keith, Wright 518 (1834) without more than a cursory statement of the evidence.
121
 “The impotence of either party at the time of marriage, is made, by the Code, Art. 16, sec. 25, ground for 
a divorce a vinculo; and impotence consists--first, in an incapacity of procreation from organic 
malformation; or, second, in incapacity for the act of copulation--and copulation, to come within.” (J.G. v 
H.G., 33 Md at 403.)
122
 Id. In the absence of statements about the presence or absence of pubic hair ovaries or testes these 
symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome (pubic hair and 
ovaries present, undescended testes absent) or Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (undescended 
testes present, pubic hair absent or decreased.)
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and incurable; the case comes within the legal definition of impotence, and is 
cause for nullity of marriage.”123
Judge Bartol cited the 1845 English case of Deane v Aveling to support his reading of the 
law. (The remainder of the opinion deals with the impact of the separation agreement the 
parties signed when they separated.)
B. The First English Speaking Case Reviewing Evidence of Physical Incapacity
Deane v Aveling124 is truly the first case to make a careful review of evidence of physical 
incapacity. Thomas Deane was 26 when he married the 25 year old Maria Aveling in 
1842. By 1844 they were in litigation. He sued for an annulment on the grounds of non-
consummation due to physical incapacity. Justice Lushington’s opinion has been cited by 
British and American courts ever since it first appeared in 1845. It merits careful 
consideration.
The medical facts in Deane v Aveling are strikingly similar to those in J.G. v H.G.
(possibly Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster Syndrome but more likely Complete Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome.125) Maria Aveling had a short vagina and no uterus. None of the 
medical examiners commented on the existence of ovaries (or testes). Some of their 
testimony is worth reproducing.
Golding Bird, M.D. testified
She is capable of having connexion with and being carnally known by man, 
meaning thereby, that although there is a total absence of a uterus, and a 
malformation of the vagina, . . . , still a very small portion of the penis can be 
undoubtedly introduced, and connexion by that means take place; and the 
appearance of her sexual organs afford a very, very strong presumption, if not 
positive evidence, that to such extent sexual intercourse has taken place; . . .  and 
also that there is every evidence of the ministrant’s capability of receiving 
sexual gratification; there is nothing attending on her state to prevent it; those 
parts tending to that result [i.e. her clitoris]  being with her fully developed; as to 
her power or capability of imparting it [sexual gratification], I can offer no 
opinion.126
123
 Id. (emphasis added)
124 D-e v A-g (falsely called D-e), 1 Rob Eccl 279 (1845). British cases always refer to this case as D-e v A-
g (falsely called D-e). American courts somehow got a hold of the parties’ full surnames and refer to the 
case as Deane v Aveling. The opinion of the English court gives their first names. Hence we know their 
whole names!
125
 Dr. Bird reported that “she had the appearance rather of a girl not having attained puberty as an adult.” 
(Id at 285). I interpret this to mean that she had little or no pubic hair and axillary hair. Pubic hair and 
axillary hair develop at the onset of puberty in response to androgen. Their presence or absence provides a 
way to distinguish between Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome (pubic and axillary hair abundant) 
and Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (pubic hair and axillary hair absent or decreased.)
126
 Id at 288. (emphasis added)
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John C. W. Lever, M.D., made similar comments and then closed with a remark about the
prospects for surgery.
I found her external sexual organs perfectly formed and developed, and that the 
formation necessary for creating sexual desires [i.e. her clitoris] was also 
perfect, but upon introducing the finger into the vagina, an impediment at once 
presented itself, and I discovered that the vagina, instead of being, as it ought 
naturally to have been, of the depth of four inches, or thereabouts, was in the said 
Maria D. of the depth of only one inch and a quarter, so far as I could judge, 
without positive admeasurement . . . and the said vagina was so constructed as to 
form a perfect cul de sac, without any means of communicating with any internal 
organ.  . .  On  the twentieth of October [1844] . . . I  . . . ascertained, to an 
absolute certainty, that there was not any uterus, and that any attempt to perform 
an operation for the extension of the vagina, would not only be useless, but, in 
all probability, fatal.127
The third medical examiner, Lawson Cape, M.D., had a somewhat different view.
She is capable of coition, but the male organ being restricted from its full natural 
insertion I can hardly designate such coition perfect, though it is beyond incipient 
coition, as personal gratification can be afforded and actual emission ensue; 
exclusive of [i.e. aside from] such restricted admission of the male organ, the act 
of coition is perfect, the only distinction as regards such act in the case of the said 
Maria A. being, that the male organ can only be inserted to the limited extent 
which I have already set forth.128
In summary, Dr. Bird and Dr. Lever were sure that Maria could be sexually gratified but 
unsure that her husband could be. Dr. Cape suggested that he could be if he ejaculated 
outside her vagina.
Given the medical testimony Judge Lushington proceeded very carefully in his opinion. 
He began
I apprehend that we are all agreed that, in order to constitute the marriage bond 
between young persons, there must be the power, present or to come, of sexual 
intercourse. Without that power, neither of the two principal ends of matrimony
can be attained, namely, a lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent 
licentiousness, and the procreation of children, according to the evident design 
of Divine Providence.129
Lushington easily disposed of Maria’s unquestionable sterility as an issue.
127
 Id at 289-290. (emphasis added)
128
 Id at 302.
129
 Id at 298. (emphasis added)
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If there can be a reasonable probability that the lady can be made capable of vera 
copula – of the natural sort of coitus, though without the power of conception, I 
cannot pronounce this marriage void…. In the case first supposed, the husband 
must submit to the misfortune of a barren wife, as much when the cause is visible 
and capable of being ascertained, as when it rests in indiscoverable and 
unascertained causes. There is no justifiable motive for intercourse with other 
women in the one case than in the other.130
Thus procreation, although an end of marriage, is not required of marriage, not even 
the possibility of procreation. Mid-twentieth century English courts cited this part of 
Lushington’s opinion to rule that
• intercourse with a condom sexually consummates a marriage,131
• prolonged penetration without seminal emission sexually consummates a 
marriage,132 and
• actual or possible surgical enlargement of a vagina (similar to Maria Aveling’s) 
precludes annulment for physical incapacity.133
Lushington quickly recognized that the key legal issue 
. . . lies in the meaning of the term “sexual intercourse.” How is it to be defined? 
This is a most disgusting and painful inquiry, but it cannot be avoided.134
He answered this as follows.
Sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of the term, is ordinary and complete 
intercourse; it does not mean partial and imperfect intercourse: yet, I cannot go 
the length of saying, that every degree of imperfection would deprive it of its 
essential character. There must be degrees difficult to deal with: but if so 
imperfect as scarcely to be natural, I should not hesitate to say that, legally 
speaking, it is no intercourse at all. I can never think that the true interest of 
society would be advanced by retaining within the marriage bonds parties driven 
to such disgusting practices. Certainly it would not tend to the prevention of 
adulterous intercourse, one of the greatest evils to be avoided.
. . . when the coitus itself is absolutely imperfect, and I must call it unnatural, 
there is not a natural indulgence of natural desire; almost of necessity disgust is 
generated, and the probable consequences of other connexions of men of 
ordinary self control become almost certain. I am of the opinion that no man 
ought to be reduced to this state of quasi unnatural connexion, and consequent 
temptation, and therefore, I should hold the marriage void.135
130
 Id at 299.
131 Baxter v Baxter, [1947] 2 All E.R. 886 specifically overruling Cowen v Cowen, [1945] 2 All E.R. 197.
132 R. v R. (otherwise F.), [1952] 1 All E.R. 1194 contradicting the Ontario case Miller v Miller [1947] Ont 
Rep 213.
133 S. v S. (otherwise W.), [1962] 3 All E.R. 55 specifically disapproving D. v D. [1954] 2 All E.R. 598.
134 D-e v A-g, 1 Rob Eccl at 298.
135
 Id at 298-299. (emphasis added)
Michael L. Rosin Page 34 08/22/2004
For Lushington the threshold lay at the point where penile-vaginal intercourse satisfies 
the husband to a sufficient extent that he does not engage in other forms of sexual activity 
with his wife or adultery with other women. We can only guess how Lushington would 
have opined in case a wife brought a complaint.136
Although not forbidden to marry again Maria Aveling faced bleak prospects. She would 
have to find a husband who would be satisfied without full penetration. Thomas Deane, 
on the other hand, was free to find himself a wife for “the lawful indulgence of the 
passions” and whatever else he pleased.
We need to return to Lushington’s preface to his argument where he wrote
I apprehend that we are all agreed that, in order to constitute the marriage bond
between young persons, there must be the power, present or to come, of sexual 
intercourse.137
Lushington clearly had in mind the 1828 case of Brown v Brown in which a 52 year old 
newlywed wife simply declined to have conjugal relations with her 60 year old newlywed 
husband. The husband sued for an annulment on grounds of non-consummation. The 
judge in that case, Lord Nicholl, refused to grant the annulment reasoning “that a man of 
sixty who marries a woman of fifty-two should be content to take her tanquam soror [as a 
sister].”138 For Lushington it was clear that Thomas Deane and Maria Aveling were 
“young people” and the Browns were not.
The evidence that Lushington had the Brown case in mind comes from the case of W- v 
H- (falsely called W-).139 That case involved a 49 year old newlywed wife with a physical 
impediment and a 54 year husband. The wife’s barrister presented Justice Nicholl’s 
tanquam soror dictum, however, the presiding judge wasn’t persuaded. He pointed out 
that in Deane v Aveling Lushington “says nothing of any limit to the age at which the 
right to complain ceases.”140 Citing the fact that the wife’s condition though curable, had 
not in fact been cured by surgery especially dangerous to a 49 year old, the judge granted 
the annulment requested.141
136
 In 1863 an English wife sought an annulment because of her husband’s impotence “caused by a long-
continued habit of self-abuse.” She lost. The court held that the husband’s impotence “might possibly but 
not probably, be cured, the questions being one of moral restraint.” (S- (falsely called E-) v E-, 3 Swab T 
240 (1863)) In the 1890s an Illinois circuit court heard a similar case in Griffith v Griffith and granted the 
wife’s suit for annulment. An appeals court threw out the annulment (55 Ill App 474 (1894)) only to have 
the annulment reinstated by the Illinois Supreme Court (162 Ill 368 (1896))
137 D-e v A-g, 1 Rob Eccl at 298. (emphasis added)
138
 1 Hagg Eccl 524 (1828).
139
 2 Swab T 240 (1861).
140
 Id at 244.
141
 “The courts decline to grant annulment for physical incapacity where, by reason of the advanced years 
of the parties at the time of the marriage, the desire for support and companionship, rather than the usual 
motives of marriage, must have actuated them.” (Hatch v Hatch, 110 NYS 18 (1908)) In this case a 56 year 
old soldier’s widow married a 69 year old man. “[W]hen she gained a husband, she lost a pension. For 
reasons not disclosed to the court, the exchange proved an unsatisfactory one to her.” (Id at 19.)
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C. Late Marriage
Late marriage, at the ages of the Browns, or W. and H. has always posed a challenge to 
defenders of the traditional view. Clearly, none of the husbands bringing the annulment 
suits just discussed were ready to take a wife as a sister but undoubtedly other men their 
age did so. They still do all the time. Can anyone expect 83 year old and 79 year old 
newlyweds to have an active sex life? I don’t. If that’s the case, then why does it matter if 
the newlyweds are members of opposite sexes or the same sex? (One of the lesbian 
couples married in San Francisco in February 2004 consisted of an 83 year old and a 79 
year old.)
Defenders of the traditional view argue that there can be no marriage between persons 
who by their natures are necessarily incapable of conceiving a child. They argue that the 
procreation of children is one of the state’s primary interests in sanctioning marriage, not 
just regulating it. They may be astonished to learn that three states allow certain 
marriages to take place only on the condition that there can be no children conceived! 
None of these states is called Massachusetts! Thirty states prohibit the marriage of first 
cousins. However, Arizona, Illinois, and Wisconsin allow first cousins of childbearing 
age to marry if one of the parties is permanently sterile.142  On the other hand, none of 
these states prohibit first cousin couples from starting a family by adopting a child.143
It is certainly incongruous to hold that some pairs of people must be forbidden from 
marrying because they are incapable of conceiving a child while others are only allowed
to marry in case they are incapable of conceiving a child.
There is more than one model for marriage.
D. Reproductive Complementarity
Twenty years ago in an Article entitle “Transsexualism and Christian Marriage”144  the 
Reverend Professor Oliver O’Donovan, currently Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral 
In Viermann v Viermann the St Louis, Missouri Court of Appeals entertained an impotency suit brought by 
an 83 year old newlywed husband against his 69 year old wife. The court affirmed a lower court judgment 
that the husband had not demonstrated that his wife’s impotency was incurable. (213 SW2d 259,261 
(1948))
142
 See Ariz Rev Stat §25-101-B (2003), 750 ILCS § 5/212(a)(4)(ii), and Wis Stat §765.03(1) (2002). These 
states also allow first cousins to marry if they are both are at least age 65 (Arizona), 50 (Illinois), or 55 
(Wisconsin). In addition, Utah and Indiana have an exception for first cousins in case both are at least age 
65. (Utah Code Ann § 30-1-1(2)(a) and Ind Code §31-11-1-2 (2003)) Utah has an exception in case both 
first cousins have reached age 55 and one is permanently sterile. (Utah Code Ann § 30-1-1(2)(b)) With 
these age limits each of these states has put in place a sharp distinction between what Nicholl and 
Lushington would have termed “young persons” and “old persons” who can only take each other tanquam 
soror or tanquam frater. Continuing in the Nicholl-Lushington vein Arizona, Illinois, and Wisconsin have 
put in place exceptions that allow first cousins who are “young persons” to marry.
143
 See Ariz Rev Stat §8-103 (2003), 750 ILCS § 50/2, and Wis Stat §48.82(1)(a) (2002).
144 Oliver O'Donovan, Transsexualism and Christian Marriage, 11 J Religious Ethics 135 (Spring 1983).
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Theology Oxford University and Canon of Christ Church, employed the “necessarily, 
rather than contingently, incapable of conception” argument when considering whether a 
post-operative transsexual could enter into a Christian marriage. For Rev. O’Donovan
The question whether a postoperative transsexual can be a partner in a marriage 
resolves itself into two related questions: Will such a marriage be a union of a 
man and a woman? And, does it matter that it should be? Leaving aside for the 
moment the first of these two, we will devote this section to the second, 
attempting to show why it has been, and remains, important to the Christian 
understanding of marriage that it is contracted between members of the opposite 
sex, between “this man and this woman.”145
Rev. O’Donovan answers his second question as follows.
There were, however, two elements of the traditional teaching on homosexuality 
which provided the lack [in a same sex marriage]: first the teaching that genital 
intimacy in homosexual relationships is wrong because the genital organs are 
made for union with the opposite sex second, the teaching that homosexual 
partnerships cannot be marriages because they are necessarily, rather than 
contingently, childless.146
Rev. O’Donovan touches on the physically intersexed throughout his Article.147 In a 
passage comparing transsexuals with the physically intersexed he writes.
A case can certainly be made at the psychological level for a dipolar opposition 
rather than a dimorphic one. It can, that is, be argued, that masculinity and 
femininity, are matters of relatively more or less rather than either-or. But it 
cannot be argued that this is the case with maleness or femaleness, the biological 
endowment from which the psychological and behavioral possibilities arise. It is 
generally well known that the starting point for dimorphic differentiation is 
already present at the conception of a child in the presence of a “Y” chromosome, 
the effect of which is to differentiate the development of male from female 
gonadal structures from which all embryos begin. The existence of 
hermaphroditic or “intersex” conditions is traced to a malfunction at some point 
in the outworking of the either-or of chromosomal endowment. The name 
145
 Id at 140. (emphasis added)
146
 Id at 141. Why do defenders of the traditional view of marriage so frequently make such statements in 
terms of “childlessness” rather than “inability to conceive a child?” Surely, they realize that adoption is a 
time honored variation for starting (or adding to) a family. When defenders of the traditional view of 
marriage argue that same sex couples cannot marry because they are “necessarily childless” they are 
asserting that same sex couples cannot be good parents. That is begging a question closely related to the 
one under examination. Framing any such discussion in terms of “childlessness” (and “childfulness”) 
disrespects all adoptive families. Framing the discussion in terms of “the ability to conceive a child” (or 
“fertility”) shows respect for all adoptive couples who have struggled with infertility and does not presume 
an answer to the question of whether same sex couples can be good parents.
147
 Rev. O’Donovan points out that Justice Ormrod’s decision in Corbett did not support Justice Bell’s 
decision in the 1979 Australian case of C. and D. (Id at 158 n6.) However, he never suggests how the case 
of C. and D. should have been decided.
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“intersex” may suggest to the public mind a kind of rural staging post, situated in 
the uninhabited countryside halfway between the cities of maleness and 
femaleness: that is why the term “hermaphrodite,” offensive as it may be, is 
conceptually truer, suggesting that the condition is one of both-and, arising from a 
malfunction of the chromosomal endowment.148
Let us consider how the marriage of Deane and Aveling fares under a rule that forbids 
marriage when the partners are “necessarily, rather than contingently” incapable of 
conceiving a child and allows marriage when the partners are capable or only 
contingently incapable of conceiving a child.
Maria Aveling’s medical examination revealed symptoms entirely consistent with a 
person conceived with XY sex chromosomes who developed testes at the 7th week of 
gestation and then experienced Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome149 causing her body to 
develop many female sexual characteristics rather than the male characteristics that 
would have developed had her body been able to process the androgens secreted by her 
testes.
Given the circumstances of her conception by a sperm cell carrying a Y sex chromosome 
containing genes that caused her gonadal ridge to develop into testes rather than ovaries 
Maria Aveling was necessarily incapable of conceiving a child150 with a man (capable of 
producing sperm cells). Thus, on the “necessarily, rather than contingently incapable” 
argument, Maria Aveling, although raised as a female, could not marry a male! In 
contrast, the gestational “malfunction” that resulted in her body’s inability to process 
male hormones (androgens) and the resulting failure to develop a complete set of male 
sexual characteristics seems to be only contingent. On this analysis, Maria Aveling’s 
inability to conceive a child with a (fertile) woman is merely contingent rather than 
necessary. Consequently, the “necessarily, rather than contingently, incapable of 
conception” argument would allow her to marry a woman, just as it would allow a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual to marry a woman.
Although Rev. O’Donovan argues that post-operative transsexuals cannot marry as 
member of their new sex, he never makes it clear whether they can marry as members of 
their old sex! Nor does he ever propose a clear rule for the physically intersexed. Indeed, 
the most recently quoted passage continues.
This does not mean that in cases of such ambiguity the chromosomal endowment 
is always the key to the person’s “real” sex, to which at all costs he or she should 
be assigned. The effect of the “both-and” malfunction is precisely that we have to 
distinguish between a person’s genotypical, or intended sex, and the phenotypical, 
148
 Id at 142-3. (emphasis added) Victoria S. Kolakowski recognized that Rev. O’Donovan takes it as a 
given that there are two and only two true sexes. (See Victoria S. Kolakowski, Toward a Christian Ethical 
Response to Transsexual Persons, 6 Theology and Sexuality 10, 26 n29 (1997)).
149
 Whether or not Maria Aveling actually experienced AIS is irrelevant. This argument holds for any XY 
person who experienced AIS and was raised as a female. Using Maria Aveling as an example merely 
personalizes the argument to an actual historical figure.
150
 Owing to the secretion of Müllerian Inhibiting Substance she also lacked a uterus to carry a child.
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or actualized sex. When confronted with the difficulties of both-and, we may be 
forced to resolve them away from the sex to which, had all gone well in gestation, 
the person would have developed. The point is simply that the ambiguity, 
however it may be resolved, is an ambiguity in a dimorphic human sexual 
pattern.151
Perhaps some physically intersexed persons have genetic endowments152 that make them 
necessarily incapable conceiving a child with anyone. Perhaps the physically intersexed 
151 O'Donovan, 11 J Religious Ethics at 143.
152
 Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is caused by a mutation to the Androgen Receptor gene on the X 
chromosome. (See Charmian Quigley et al, Androgen Receptor Defects: Historical, Clinical, and 
Molecular Perspectives, 16 Endocrine Rev 271,274 (1995).)
In the passage quoted above Rev. O’Donovan speaks of “a malfunction of the chromosomal endowment.” 
(Id.) This belies 2 significant misunderstandings of modern genetics. The first is that chromosomes are 
merely structures that carry aggregations of genes. Chromosomes only act as a whole unit during meiosis 
and mitosis. Developmental pathways begin with expression at the gene level, not at the chromosome level. 
The second is that the expression of a rare recessive gene is not a malfunction. It is simply the law-like 
biochemical outcome of the underlying genetic endowment that results in a lack of functionality present in 
the absence of one or both dominant genes. In some cases, such as the sickle cell trait, persons with one 
recessive gene and one dominant gene have an adaptive advantage (resistance to malaria) in certain 
environments compared to persons with two dominant genes. It is unfortunate that persons with two 
recessive genes have sickle cell anemia – a significant impairment of the blood’s ability to carry oxygen. 
However, that is not a malfunction of the underlying genetic (or chromosomal) endowment.
Given that AIS is caused by the presence of a recessive gene on the X chromosome expressing itself in a 
law-like fashion by not producing androgen receptors, then it seems that Maria Aveling’s sterility as an XY 
male is necessary rather than contingent. The fact that she inherited an X-linked recessive gene is certainly 
a contingent fact of her conception, but so is the fact that she was conceived by a sperm cell carrying a Y 
chromosome rather than a sperm cell carrying an X chromosome. 
Rev. O’Donovan asserts that 
the only way to understand biological ambiguity, even at the chromosomal level, is as a 
malfunction in the dimorphic program. (Id at 160 n11.) 
the ambiguity, however it may be resolved, is an ambiguity in a dimorphic human sexual pattern. 
It appears, then, that the Christian understanding of marriage, which relates to the dimorphism of 
human biology, is not out of tune with modern medical understanding. (Id at 143)
By now it should be patently obvious to readers that this Article is grounded in the view that there are more 
than two suites of sexual characteristics in humankind. Rather than pursuing this argument at the moment I 
would like to consider Rev. O’Donovan’s claim that “the Christian understanding of marriage, which 
relates to the dimorphism of human biology, is not out of tune with modern medical understanding.” Not 
surprisingly, Rev. O’Donovan focuses completely on reproductive anatomy.
If we want to have a modern scientific understanding of the predominant sexual dimorphism in humankind 
then we need to consider all aspects of that dimorphism, not just the predominant dimorphism in the 
reproductive systems. We are all aware that on the average males are larger and more muscular, have more 
body hair, and a deeper voice than females. Comparative primatology interprets this data as indicative of a 
polygynous (one male mating with multiple females) ancestry for humankind (See for example Alan 
Dixson, Primate Sexuality: Comparative Studies of the Prosimians, Monkeys, Apes, and Human Beings
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cannot enter into Christian marriage as described by Rev. O’Donovan. That should not 
preclude them from entering into a secular, American marriage.
V. BINARY CLASSIFICATION IN LAW
The law makes many binary classifications. We have all felt the impact of not having 
reached the age of majority at which we acquire all of our legal rights. Certainly setting 
the age of majority at 18 (or 21) has never been intended as reflecting a fundamental 
ontological distinction. It is nothing more than a best estimate of the threshold at which 
individuals become capable of accepting the full set of legal rights and responsibilities. 
We expect each and every one of us to cross this threshold. When the threshold appears 
to be set inappropriately for someone, legal mechanisms exist to provide rights earlier 
(emancipation) or defer them (guardianship for mental incompetence for example.)
A. White versus Non-White: Racial Classification in the Context of Immigration
In 1790 the first Congress exercised its constitutional authority “to establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”153 In passing the first act Naturalization Act Congress limited the 
prospect of American citizenship to
Any alien being a free white person 154
without bothering to define what it meant to be “white.”  Following the Civil War 
Congress extended naturalization to “persons of African nativity or African descent.”155
In the area of naturalization law, the boundary between “white” and “non-white” 
remained unchallenged for well over a century.156 The phrase “white person” remained, 
undefined, in the Naturalization Act of 1906.
Takao Ozawa had been raised and educated in California and Hawaii after having been 
born in Japan. His children were U.S. citizens by virtue of their birth in Hawaii. 
Considering the color of his skin Ozawa applied for citizenship. It was refused.
Ozawa took his case to the Supreme Court. In November, 1922, writing for a unanimous 
Supreme Court that included Justices Brandeis and Holmes, Justice George Sutherland 
argued that “white” did not refer just to the single factor of skin color.
28,33 (Oxford 1998) Thus, the monogamous union of one female and one male is not the only form of 
mating “in tune” with a modern scientific understanding of human biology.
153
 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4a.
154
 1 Stat 103, c3 (1790)
155
 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 §7, 16 Stat 254.
156
 For analyses of how the boundary between “white” and “non-white” was contested in other areas see Ian 
F. Haney López, White By Law : The Legal Construction of Race (NYU 1996) and Ariela J. Gross, 
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination In The Nineteenth-Century South, 108 Yale L J 109 
(1998).
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Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is 
impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among 
Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the 
swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of 
the brown or yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a 
confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into the other, 
without any practical line of separation. . . . the federal and state courts, in an 
almost unbroken line, have held that the words “white person” were meant to 
indicate only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.157
Realizing, perhaps, that he had merely replaced one definitional problem (“white 
persons”) with another (“Caucasian race”) Sutherland warned that the issue was not yet 
resolved.
The determination that the words “white person” are synonymous with the words 
“a person of the Caucasian race” simplifies the problem, although it does not 
entirely dispose of it. Controversies have arisen and will no doubt arise again in 
respect of the proper classification of individuals in border line cases. The effect
of the conclusion that the words “white person” means a Caucasian is not to 
establish a sharp line of demarcation between those who are entitled and those 
who are not entitled to naturalization, but rather a zone of more or less debatable 
ground outside of which, upon the one hand, are those clearly eligible, and 
outside of which, upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for 
citizenship.158
Sutherland undoubtedly knew that the Court’s docket already contained the next 
definitional dispute. In January, 1923 the Court heard the case of United States v Thind. 
Bhagat Singh Thind was described as “a high-caste Hindu, of full Indian blood.”159 Given 
his white skin he claimed to be a member of the Caucasian race. The US District Court in 
Oregon had granted him citizenship over the objection of the Naturalization Examiner. 
The Examiner sued and Thind’s case went to the Supreme Court. Once again, Justice 
Sutherland wrote for a unanimous court.
Sutherland began his opinion by acknowledging that the piecemeal engineering in Ozawa
was merely a stopgap measure. Congress had used the phrase “white persons” and not 
“Caucasian race.” When Congress used the words “white person,” Sutherland opined, it 
used them as words “of common speech and not of scientific origin.”160 If the scientific 
meaning of “Caucasian” were employed then it would
include not only the Hindu, but some of the Polynesians (that is, the Maori, 
Tahitians, Samoans, Hawaiians, and others), the Hamites of Africa, upon the 
ground of the Caucasic cast of their features, though in color they range from 
157 Ozawa, 260 US at 197.
158
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brown to black. We venture to think that the average well informed white 
American would learn with some degree of astonishment that the race to which 
he belongs is made up of such heterogeneous elements.161
That could not be allowed to happen. “The intention was to confer the privilege of 
citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to 
all who could not be so classified.”162 Justice Sutherland concluded
What we now hold is that the words “free white persons” are words of common 
speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common 
man, synonymous with the word “Caucasian” only as that word is popularly 
understood.163
Justice Sutherland had preserved the intent of the first Congress and it successors. 
Naturalization rights belonged to “white persons” (and after 1870 Africans). “Non-white 
persons” were denied these rights. If Congress wanted to ease restrictions on 
naturalization it could. In 1952 it finally did.164
B. White versus Non-White: Racial Classification in the Context of Marriage
Racial classification also lay at the root of the last great American legal struggle for the 
right to marry: the right to marry regardless of race. An introductory section of the 
Virginia code defined “Colored persons and Indians” and even allowed an “Indian” to 
have up to one-sixteenth Negro blood.165 However, the anti-miscegenation code itself 
merely defined the meaning of the term “white person.”
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save 
a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and 
American Indian. For the purpose of this act, the term "white person" shall apply 
only to the person who has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than 
Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the 
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American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be 
white persons.166
The Virginia anti-miscegenation laws focused exclusively on preserving the purity of the 
white race167 by prohibiting a complementary marital relationship between a “white 
person” and anyone else. By not caring about preserving the purity of the “black, yellow, 
malay, and red”168 races the Virginia marriage laws did not run the risk of leaving 
someone out in the cold as “none of the above” without the right to marry anyone. 
Consequently, nothing else needed definition since, for the purposes of the anti-
miscegenation laws, the only categories that mattered were: “White persons” and its 
complement “non-White persons”, i.e. none of the above; everyone else.
The traditional view of marriage requires complementarity between spouses: a woman 
and a man. Therefore, the traditional view of marriage almost certainly requires separate 
definitions of “female” and “male”. Defining just one of the sexes and leaving “everyone 
else” to the other sex is likely to lead to highly unusual results. Recall that although 
Justice Ormrod ruled that April Ashley was not a woman, he did not rule that April 
Ashley was a man.
C. Justice Ormrod on Sexual Binarism
Justice Ormrod’s decision in Corbett has long been castigated by the transsexual rights 
community. However, he at least had the good sense to recognize that the physically 
intersexed presented a significant challenge for the law and intentionally left their status 
undecided.
Justice Ormrod happens to have been trained as a physician as well as a lawyer. In March 
1972 he addressed the Medico-Legal Society (of the UK) on the topic of The Medico-
Legal Aspects of Sex Determination. It was published in the Society’s journal.169
Throughout the Article Justice Ormrod remained adamant that sex reassignment
operations do not and cannot change the sex of the patient. They merely remove 
the physical attributes of one sex and construct imitations of the other.  . .
they remain, unhappily for themselves, what they always were – psychologically 
abnormal males or psychologically abnormal females.170 . . . 
[April Ashley’s] operation, in my view, was irrelevant because the result was pure 
artefact.171
At the end of his address Justice Ormrod breathed a sigh of relief. “I was fortunate to find 
myself faced with a transsexual.”172 During the course of his address he made it clear 
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how well he understood the wide variety of physically intersexed conditions including 
descriptions of 
• Androgenital Syndrome (Now termed Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia and/or 
Progestin-Induced Virilization)
• Testicular feminization. (Now termed Complete or Partial Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome)
• Testicular failure syndrome.173
Justice Ormrod also understood the wide range of variation in sex chromosome 
combinations. After reminding his audience that “there are 46 chromosomes in the 
normal cell nucleus” he went on to mention X0 (Turner syndrome), XXY (Kleinfelter’s 
syndrome), XXX, XYY, and XX/XY combinations. Justice Ormrod declared “XX/XY 
individuals [who have some cells with XX sex chromosomes and other cells with XY sex 
chromosomes] are true hermaphrodites” 174 and warned his audience that “The 
chromosomal test, therefore, determines the sex of the individual cells of the body.”175 In 
contrast
The true hermaphrodite defies classification except possibly on the social 
criterion. Genitally, gonadally, and chromosomally they are ambiguous.176
How April Ashley felt about herself did not matter to Justice Ormrod. Her genitals, 
gonads, and chromosomes were (presumably) unambiguous at birth.  She did not defy 
Justice Ormrod’s anatomical classification.  Although Justice Ormrod would not consider 
psychological factors in April Ashley’s case he did consider them relevant for the 
physically intersexed. The ambiguity among their genitals, gonads, and chromosomes 
gives them the right to choose a feminine or masculine identity.
Doctors are primarily concerned with the problem of how their intersex patients 
can best live in society, that is, which of the two roles, masculine or feminine, will 
best suit the individual patient. This can be conveniently, if not wholly accurately, 
expressed by asking which gender should the patient be encouraged to assume.177
. . .
In all cases [decisions about treatment] will involve deciding how the patient’s 
future life should be planned i.e. should the patient retain the gender in which he 
or she has been living or should it be changed.178
Clearly, Justice Ormrod thought that the physically intersexed could be given a 
“completed” sexual identity of female or male. Nevertheless, Justice Ormrod was glad 
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that he did not have to rule in such a case. During the short Question and Answer period a 
barrister named Jackson asked
what Sir Roger [Ormrod] would have decided had he found April Ashley had 
been an hermaphrodite in the way in which he defined the term.179
Justice Ormrod replied
I suppose like all judges I sort of relax ultimately on the onus of proof as a cozy
kind of couch, when I cannot think of any other conceivable way of getting out of 
the hole I’m in . . . I think that the onus of proof would really come into it in this 
way, would it not: that one would say that the individual had failed to prove that 
he – as the case may be – is a woman. I think you would have to take it and 
ultimately rely on the onus of proof if one were really stuck.180
For Justice Ormrod the physically intersexed person “completed” into a woman would 
have to be “capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.” The same 
for someone completed into a man.
Commentators such as Professor Greenberg have focused on Justice Ormrod’s reduction 
of sex to a set of anatomical features and his refusal to consider hormonal and 
psychological factors. I want to focus on Justice Ormrod’s insistence on strict binarism, 
that is, the classification of all persons into female and male exclusively and 
exhaustively. 
Justice Ormrod began his address by stating
The law, which is essentially an artifact, is a system of regulations which depends 
upon precise definitions; medicine is a biological science and therefore depends 
on the facts of biology. The law is obliged to classify its material into exclusive 
categories. it is therefore, a binary system designed to produce conclusions of the 
Yes or No type. Biological phenomena, however, cannot be reduced to exclusive 
categories so that medicine cannot often give Yes or No answers.181
In one sense Justice Ormrod is correct. If the law makes classifications it needs to have as 
precise a definition as possible for courts to apply, especially if a binary classification is 
made. All of this begs the questions of whether a classification can be made effectively 
and whether a classification ought to be made. When Justice Ormrod writes
Biological research over the past 25 years has shown that none of the criteria for 
sex determination are completely reliable and that the categories male and 
female are not mutually exclusive. This work has greatly increased our 
understanding of sexual anomalies but in the process it has made it extremely 
179
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difficult to find a satisfactory definition of the sexual status of an individual 
whose sex is in doubt.182
it is difficult to imagine how categories that science says are not exclusive can be made 
exclusive and untraversable for legal purposes. 
D. Dr. Ombrédanne’s Sexual Balance Sheet
In the middle of the 20th century the renowned French uro-genital surgeon Dr. Louis 
Ombrédanne (1871-1956) tried to find a solution to this dilemma. He suggested that 
surgery could be employed to “perfect” the anatomy of persons otherwise incapable of 
marrying as male or female. Ombrédanne gave his analysis in a study183 presented to a 
conference at the Centre d’Etudes Laënnec in Paris during the Winter of 1946-7 
sponsored by the Archdiocese of Paris. (Emmanuel Cardinal Suhard, Archbishop of 
Paris, opened the conference.) 
Based on a lifetime’s work in uro-genital surgery, presented in his 1939 masterwork Les 
Hermaphrodites et la Chirurgie (“ Hermaphrodites and Surgery”), Ombrédanne begins 
his analysis by asserting “There is no criterion of sex. There is no such thing as regular 
sex.”
184
 (emphasis added) Ombrédanne first considers external sexual anatomy and then 
gonadal function but immediately provides counterexamples to such simple sets of 
criteria. Nevertheless, Ombrédanne argues, “We must, however, define sex, since 
marriage is permissible only between subjects of different sexes.” 185
With all simple sets of criteria failing, Ombrédanne turns to Ulpian’s (160-228) proposal
that “a subject belongs to the sex which prevails in him; and this definition seems to us to 
be the only one sustainable.”186 He continues
But to speak of a prevalence or, if you prefer, a predominance, supposes an 
appreciation based on a sexual balance-sheet. And the balance-sheet which 
results will be based on both forms and on functions. It is that balance-sheet 
which will make us consider a subject as masculine or feminine from the point of 
view of marriage.187
According to Ombrédanne, someone of ambiguous sex must be made “capable of 
copulation in conformity with their chosen sex”188 to be capable of entering into marriage 
as a man or a woman. If necessary, they must be “willing to perfect surgically their 
anatomical sexual apparatus with a view to this possibility of copulation.”189
182
 Id. (emphasis added)
183
 Louis Ombrédanne, The Marriage of Hermaphrodites (Malachy Gerard Carroll, trans.) in Dom Peter 
Flood, ed., 2 New Problems in Medical Ethics 47 (Newman Press 1953).
184
 Id at 50.
185
 Id at 51.
186
 Id.
187
 Id at 51-52.
188
 Id at 53.
189
 Id.
Michael L. Rosin Page 46 08/22/2004
The major stumbling block in Ombrédanne’s approach is that he admits that the balance 
sheet he mentions cannot be valid until the genital functions show themselves, which is 
not until puberty!190 Surgical correction of an hermaphrodite must wait until adolescence 
if not early adulthood.191 Of course, these stages are well after a person has established a
gender role in society! None of the cases Ombrédanne relates involve someone changing
sex roles via surgery. Indeed, he warns against premature “sex-assignment” surgery. He 
mentions a patient who had had two previous “modifications” as an example of the harm 
parents could cause a child by having its “civil state [i.e. sexual classification] modified 
too early.”192
In his comment the Catholic ethicist Father Tesson, Professor of Moral Theology at the
Institut Catholique de Paris, immediately recognized that the surgical approach 
suggested by Ombrédanne offered a possible means for the physically intersexed to 
resolve their situation and enter into marriage as a man or a woman. Father Tesson began 
his analysis by asserting
It is indisputable that a human being always has the right to fix himself or herself 
as clearly as possible in one of the two sexes of humanity.193
At that time the marital potency of some surgically “perfected” persons remained in 
doubt in the eyes of the Catholic Church. In particular, there was no clear doctrinal 
statement whether a woman lacking ovaries and a uterus was considered potent for the 
sake of marriage. The Courts of the Roman Rota (the judicial arm of Roman Catholicism) 
made rulings on both sides of the question.194 Father Tesson held that ovaries and a uterus 
were not required for a woman to be considered capable of entering into marriage.
So did Ombrédanne’s English language editor, Father Peter Flood. Father Flood thought 
that the more liberal view expressed by Father Tesson could be
reinforced by the following consideration: It seems to us that even when the 
vagina is apparently completely absent, there very probably exist in its usual site 
tissues which developed from the original embryonic cells which, but for an 
accident in the course of their growth, would have produced the specialized cells 
that form the fully developed vagina. In a sense, therefore the surgeon, operating 
to form a new vagina in this area is operating undeveloped or insufficiently 
developed vaginal tissues or at least on a lower grade of tissues formed from 
them.195
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Little did Father Flood know that as he was expressing these views bio-medicine196 was 
learning that these short to non-existent vaginas would have developed into male rather 
than female anatomical structures had there not been “an accident in the course of their 
growth.” Starting with Maria Aveling in 1845 many of the wives described as having 
short vaginas ending in a cul de sac were undoubtedly persons with XY sex 
chromosomes who had experienced partial or complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome 
that inhibited development of male characteristics other than rudimentary testes!
E. The Right to Be a Member of One Sex or the Other
In the half century since Ombrédanne’s essay appeared a handful of Catholic ethicists 
have concerned themselves with the capability of the physical intersexed to enter into 
marriage. Father Thomas J. O’Donnell, S.J, a professorial lecturer in medical ethics at 
Georgetown Medical School, gave perhaps the most complete treatment in the chapter 
title “Medico-Canonical-Moral Aspects of Marriage” his 1976 book Medicine and 
Christian Morality.197
Father O’Donnell was well aware of the breakthroughs achieved in embryology in the 
third quarter of the 20th century.
An unusual combination of constitutional, hormonal, and probably hereditary 
factors during prenatal development can give rise to various types of bi-sexual 
and intersexual anatomical anomalies in the generative system. This seems less 
strange if considered in the light of the sexually indifferent stage of embryonic 
development, when the urogenital sinus is common to the openings of the 
muellerian, wolffian, and metanephric ducts . . . and the genital tubercle becomes 
the male penis and the female clitoris. It is easy to see how any unusual influence 
of development could give rise to hermaphroditic anomalies.198
In spite of understanding the underlying embryology Father O’Donnell struggled 
mightily to fit all of humanity into two fundamental ontological categories: FEMALE and
MALE. In so doing he elaborated on Father Tesson’s claim.
Everyone has a right to be a member of one sex or the other. The human race has 
received its pattern of sexual distinction ultimately from the Author of Nature.199
(emphasis added)
It would certainly be surprising for a Catholic ethicist not to ground this fundamental 
distinction in the Divine.
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Here we encounter the clearest presentation of the conceptual tension faced by Father 
O’Donnell. If there are two fundamental ontological categories of FEMALE and MALE 
and if everyone is born into one (and only one) sex then what need is there for a right
to be a member of “one sex or the other”?200 Father O’Donnell continues with a passage 
that makes it seem that the problem is an epistemological problem of knowing what sex a 
person is rather than it being an ontological problem of what sex the person is in reality.
When anomalies occur which render accurate identification of sex problematical, 
the tendency has been to refer to the individuals in terms of “intersexuality” or 
“bisexuality” Recent medical literature reflect a much truer and healthier 
approach to the problem by referring to it in terms of unfinished sexual 
development…. The ultimate question of which sex is properly identifiable in a 
given case is a question for the medical specialist to answer . . . And the action of 
the surgeon who helps, by his art, those who wish to escape from the sexual 
indetermination imposed on them by nature, is perfectly justified.201 (emphases 
added)
Once again, we see the quest for the underlying essence of FEMALE and MALE.
Father Tesson and Father O’Donnell each speak of rights. Of course, rights are not 
necessarily requirements. A large portion of the American electorate chooses not to 
exercise its right to vote. Neither Father Tesson nor Father O’Donnell requires an 
intersexed person to undergo any medical treatment unless they want to marry.
I have given a lengthy review of physical incapacity cases earlier. There is no need to 
rehearse Father O’Donnell’s arguments requiring medical intervention to repair cases of 
physical incapacity in the context of marital relations. However, there is one additional 
case in which Father O’Donnell requires medical intervention in order to marry: the 
perfect hermaphrodite who is over-equipped with genitalia. For Father O’Donnell 
Perfect hermaphrodites are described as persons possessing all the generative 
organs, properly developed, of both male and female; so that the person can 
generate, or at least copulate, either as a male or a female.202 (emphasis added)
In spite of pronouncements stretching back over a millennium that a person in whom 
“neither sex prevails” can choose one sex so long as they forsake the other, Father 
O’Donnell cautiously offers an opinion that such persons cannot enter into a Catholic 
marriage as they are. “It is at least probable that such persons cannot marry because it is 
probable that the natural law demands distinction of sex in marriage.”203 Like the XX 
husband in the 1979 Australian case of C. and D. these persons are not truly members of 
either sex, at least not yet. They must have surgery to remove themselves from the 
twilight zone on intersexuality. At least Father O’Donnell offers them that prospect.
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VI. CAN THE RIGHT TO MARRY DEPEND ON SEXUAL DISAMBIGUATION SURGERY?
Can the right to marry depend on corrective surgery to make oneself a member of one sex 
or the other?
A. W v W – Sexual Disambiguation Surgery is Sufficient (England, 2001)
In the one case in which an English speaking court upheld the marriage of a physically 
intersexed person, the court relied on the fact that there had been surgery while 
recognizing the legal conundrum that would have been faced had there not been surgery. 
In the 2000 case of W v W a husband who had already been divorced by his wife sought 
to have the marriage declared null and void so that he could remarry in the church. Once 
again an English language court faced the question of whether a wife who had partial 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome “was, or was not, a female at the date of the marriage 
ceremony.”204  Justice Charles, the presiding judge, held that the wife was indeed a 
female at the time of the marriage and dismissed the application for annulment.
In this case the wife was born in 1947 with ambiguous external genitalia, chromosomal 
sex that “appeared to be male”205 and given a boy’s name. In spite of the fact that her 
parents tried to raise her as a boy she demonstrated feminine interests from her earliest 
childhood. By her early teens she had developed feminine breasts and a romantic interest 
in boys. Greatly annoyed by this her father attempted to masculinize her with testosterone 
injections and threatened surgery to reduce the size of her breasts. At 17 she ran away 
from home for good, took a woman’s name, and rid herself of all appearances of 
masculinity. From that point on she lived her life as a woman. Gender conforming 
surgery originally planned for her early 20s had to be postponed until she was 40 due to a 
possible “cerebrovascular accident.” She started estrogen therapy in her early 30s.206
Justice Charles recognized that this case placed him squarely in the territory suggested by 
Justice Ormrod 30 years earlier in Corbett v Corbett where the three criteria of 
chromosomes, gonads and genitals are not congruent. Contrasting his case to Justice 
Ormrod’s Justice Charles emphasized the fact that prior to surgery the wife could not 
have engaged in sexual intercourse as either a man or a woman,207 and that in this case, as 
a result of her surgery, the husband and wife had the capacity to consummate their 
marriage sexually.208
The fact that the couple could sexually consummate their marriage by an act of penile-
vaginal intercourse meant that Justice Charles would have to declare that the wife was not 
a female to grant an annulment. Justice Charles considered the wife’s ability to 
204 W v W, [2001] 2 Weekly L Rep 674,675. Also online at http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/w-v-w.htm, last 
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consummate the marriage sexually as a female to be a significant factor but not the 
decisive factor for determining whether she was a female for the purposes of marriage.209
In my judgment…. the decision as to whether individuals involved are female (or 
male) for the purposes of marriage should be made having regard to their 
development and all of the factors listed in Corbett’s case, namely (i) 
chromosomal factors; (ii) gonadal factors (i.e. presence or absence of testes or 
ovaries); (iii) genital factors (including internal sex organs); (iv) psychological 
factors; (v) hormonal factors, and (vi) secondary sexual characteristics such as 
distribution of hair, breast development, physique etc)210
Justice Charles suggested that if the wife “had been born today the medical decision 
taken would have been that she should be brought up as a girl.”211 But what clinched the 
decision for Justice Charles was the fact that the wife had made “a final choice to live as
a woman well before she started taking estrogen and before she had surgery”212
Throughout his opinion Justice Charles recognized that failing to find the wife to be a 
female for the purposes of marriage could leave her in a twilight zone with the XX 
husband in the 1979 Australian case of C. and D, unable to marry anyone. At one point 
he asked “Are people who do not satisfy the biological test in Corbett’s case neither men 
nor women nor male nor female for the purposes of marriage? ”213 and suggested 
This is a possible result but not one that I reach…. In my judgment such a result 
would create as many problems as it solved in the difficulties that already exist in 
defining a woman or a man, or a male or female, for the purposes of marriage by 
creating a third category the boundaries of which would not be clear.214
No doubt he felt fortunate that the wife in W v W had had surgery to create an artificial 
vagina.
B. Sexual Disambiguation Surgery and Civil Rights – A Nineteenth Century Case
In 1852 a Dr. S. D. Gross, Professor of Surgery at the University of Louisville, published 
an Article describing surgery he had performed on a 3 year old who had been raised as a 
girl since birth. Her parents became concerned when she began to show masculine 
tendencies at two years of age.
A careful examination of the external genitals disclosed the following 
circumstances: There was neither a penis nor a vagina; but, instead of the former, 
there was a small clitoris, and, instead of the latter, a superficial depression, or 
cul-de-sac, covered with mucous membrane, and devoid of everything like an 
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aperture or inlet. The urethra occupied the usual situation, and appeared to be 
entirely natural; the nymphae were remarkably diminutive; but the labia were well 
developed and contained each a well-formed testis, quite as large and consistent 
as the organ generally is at the same age in boys.215
Gross decided to remove the testes. He thought that they had been the source of the 
child’s masculine behavior. More ominously, he thought, they would become the source 
of sexual desire at puberty that might “lead to the ruin of her character and peace of 
mind.”216 Examining the testes after removal Gross found them to be “perfectly formed in 
every respect” thereby confirming his opinion.217 Dr. Gross saw the young girl many 
times in the three years that elapsed between surgery and publication. He reported that 
“Her disposition and habits have materially changed, and are now those of a girl.”218
There were no further reports on the young girl. Gross doubted that she would marry219
but congratulated himself for having removed the potential source of sexual desire.
Of one thing we can be certain, Gross’s patient did not enjoy the right to vote (unless she 
lived until the ratification of the 19th amendment.) Alfred Swaine Taylor, a leading 
medico-legal authority of the day commented “It is clear from Dr. Gross’s description, 
that this being was deprived of the rights and privileges of a male by the removal of the 
testicles.”220
C. The Integrity of the Body
In the 1966 case of Schmerber v California the Supreme Court held that blood drawn 
against the will of a suspected drunk driver was admissible as evidence. Writing for the 
narrow 5-4 majority Justice Brennan declared
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value.221
while defending this most minor invasion of bodily integrity. In so doing Brennan warned 
that the ruling should not be read as permitting more substantial intrusions. Two decades 
later the Court unanimously held that the Commonwealth of Virginia had no right to 
compel a suspect to undergo surgery so that a bullet could be retrieved from his body to 
be placed in evidence against him. Writing for the Court Justice Brennan recognized that 
such an intrusion on Rudolph Lee’s bodily integrity went too far.222
If compelling a person to undergo surgery merely to remove a bullet intrudes so far on 
bodily integrity that it denies the fundamental 4th amendment right to be “secure in 
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[one’s] person” what can we think of requiring surgery to create unambiguous sexual 
characteristics as a prerequisite for exercising the fundamental right to marry?223 Such a 
position expresses more inhumanity than the opinion of a 1906 Kentucky court a century 
ago which wrote
We are of opinion that appellant [husband] was not required, or called upon, to 
resort to surgery in order to construct a wife.224
as it granted an annulment for physical incapacity to a forty-something year old husband 
several years the senior of his forty-something year old wife. She merely suffered from a 
rigid hymen preventing penetration.225 They had cohabitated for all of three days!
If the state can require sexual disambiguation surgery as a prerequisite for the marriage of 
the physically intersexed then might it not be reasonable to infer that the state can also 
compel an infertile person to undergo infertility treatment as a prerequisite to marriage? 
or to require forced sterilization of a fertile person as a prerequisite to marriage? The 
Supreme Court has emphatically answered “NO” to these last two questions.
While it may shock some of my Brethren that the Court today holds that the 
Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my view it is far more 
shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does 
not include protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is 
at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a 
slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married 
persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth 
control also would seem to be valid.226
In this day and age it is hard to imagine how the exercise of any fundamental liberty such 
as the right to vote or the right to marry can depend on the outcome of surgery. Yet that is 
223
 For discussions of the more general topic of the appropriateness of “gender correcting” surgery see 
generally Suzanne J. Kessler, Lessons from the Intersexed (Rutgers 1998) and Alice Domurat Dreger, 
’Ambiguous Sex’ – or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality 28 Hastings 
Center Report, 24 (May-June 1998). Also online at http://www.isna.org/drupal/node/view/106, last visited 
on March 21, 2004. This topic is just starting to draw the attention of legal scholarship. See, for example, 
Hazel Glenn Beh and Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical And Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians 
Perform Sex Assignment Surgery On Infants With Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 Mich J Gender & L 1 (2000); 
Kishka-Kamari Ford, "First, Do No Harm"--The Fiction of Legal Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing 
Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 469 (2001), Patricia L Martin, Moving Toward an 
International Standard in Informed Consent: The Impact of Intersexuality and the Internet on the Standard 
of Care, 9 Duke J Gender L & Pol'y 135 (2002); and Alyssa Connell Lareau, Note: Who Decides? Genital 
Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 92 Georgetown L J 129 (2003).
224 Mutter v Mutter, 97 SW 394 (1906).
225
 Daston and Park report that about 1560 “a gentleman of Anjou petitioned to have his marriage annulled 
on the grounds that his wife had a penis or clitoris almost two inches long which hurt him during 
intercourse and prevented him from penetrating her, the court ruled that the marriage could stand if she 
would consent to having her member removed.” (Daston and Park, 1(5) Critical Matrix at 7 (cited in note 
___) Faced with the prospect of such surgery (without anesthesia) the wife declined the surgery and the 
marriage was annulled. (Id.)
226 Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479,497 (1965) (Goldberg concurring)
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the twilight zone in which the physically intersexed may find themselves so long as 
marriage is restricted to the union of one woman and one man.
If the cases of C. and D. and W v W demonstrate that the physically intersexed run the 
risk of having the validity of their marriages called into question even after surgery, then 
there is even more of a risk in the absence of surgery! Certainly these are the same risks 
that were run by light skinned persons of color trying to “pass” who married white 
persons when states outlawed interracial marriage.
The Littleton and Gardiner cases demonstrate that the validity of a marriage can be 
questioned even after it has ended with the death of one of the spouses. In both of those 
cases the transgendered spouse survived. However, it is entirely possible that a Gardiner-
like intestacy case could arise after the death of the transgendered spouse. Consider the 
possibility of a case in which a wealthy transgendered spouse dies intestate leaving a 
surviving spouse and a sibling. The sibling quite probably knows the transgendered 
person’s life history and could bring a legal action to have the marriage declared void ab 
initio, thereby completely disinheriting the surviving spouse in favor of the sibling. It is 
even possible that the surviving spouse would be unaware of the deceased’s life history. 
Even if the courts upheld the validity of the marriage the surviving spouse could incur 
significant legal expenses. Any infringement on the marital rights of the physically 
intersexed also infringes on the marital rights of those persons they marry or wish to 
marry.
VII. CONCLUSION
Race has long been a deeply ingrained category in American consciousness. Race was 
such a prominent factor during the Reconstruction era that even attempts to outlaw racial 
inequality were defined in terms of race!
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right 
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.”227 (emphasis 
added)
It took over a century for the Supreme Court to recognize that “Clear-cut [racial] 
categories do not exist.”228 Race is not a fundamental ontological category neatly 
dividing humanity into a small number of buckets exclusively and exhaustively.229
227
 1870 Voting Rights Act, 16 Stat 144, now 42 USC § 1981a.
228 Saint Francis College et al v Al-Khazraji, 481 US 604,610 (1987)
229
 “The Supreme Court’s holding in Thind indicates that courts, when faced with ‘scientific’ evidence that 
does not comport with their common understanding of race, rejected the scientific framework. These early-
twentieth-century opinions support the modern understanding that race has become socially constructed; 
race is whatever the average American believes it is.” Julie A. Greenberg, Definitional Dilemmas: Male or 
Female? Black or White? The Law’s Failure to Recognize Intersexuals and Multiracials, in Toni Lester ed, 
Gender Nonconformity, Race, and Sexuality : Charting the Connections,107-108 (Wisconsin 2002).
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Nor is sex a fundamental ontological category neatly dividing all of humanity into 
FEMALE and MALE exclusively and exhaustively. The cases reviewed represent just 
some of the wide variety of atypical but natural human experience described in the 
appendix which gives a brief overview of physically intersexed conditions. 
In the last 5 years two American courts have given different single factor answers to the 
questions of who is a woman and who is a man. In Texas, sex is determined by 
chromosomes, in Kansas by the ability to generate egg cells or sperm cells. These single 
factor tests may have been sufficient for the individual transsexual cases presented to 
these courts. However, each of these single factor tests would fail spectacularly if applied 
to a physically intersexed person such as a woman who had experienced Complete 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome or the XX husband in the 1979 Australian case of C. 
and D. We can only guess how a Texas court would apply Chief Justice Hardberger’s 
chromosomal test to someone with an abundance of cells with both XY and XX (or X0) 
sex chromosomes. Similarly, we can only imagine how a person born with ovotestes or  a 
functional ovary and a functional testis or with two dysfunctional gonads would fare in 
Kansas court forced to apply the Kansas Supreme Court’s gonadal test defining a woman 
as someone able to produce egg cells and a man as someone able to produce sperm cells.
Single factor tests are not always conclusive and when they are they can give 
unanticipated results.
Justice Ormrod’s opinion in Corbett specified three physiological factors required to 
answer the question of who is a woman and who is a man: chromosomes, gonads, and 
genitals. Justice Ormrod’s opinion had the virtue of recognizing its own incompleteness: 
by definition the physically intersexed could not be classified unambiguously according 
to the three factors he gave. Failing to heed Justice Ormrod’s warning of incompleteness 
the Australian court in C. and D declared the XX husband to be neither a man nor a 
woman. The fact that the multi-factor definition was not exhaustive did not disturb that 
court.
Justice Ormrod would most likely have ruled differently in the case of C. and D. In his 
1972 address to the Medico-Legal Society he declared
The true hermaphrodite defies classification except possibly on the social 
criterion230. (emphasis added)
allowing a person’s sexual identity to come into play. When pressed how he would have 
decided the case if April Ashley had been a physically intersexed person (as defined by 
the Corbett decision) Justice Ormrod responded that he would have relied on “onus of 
proof.” April Ashley would have needed to “capable of performing the essential role of a 
woman in marriage.” Given the long line of cases beginning with Deane v Aveling that 
did not even require a wife to have a uterus or ovaries this can only mean one thing. 
Justice Ormrod would have required April Ashley to demonstrate that she was capable of 
230
 Ormrod, 40 Medico-Legal J at 82 (cited in note ___).
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“sexual intercourse, in the proper meaning of the term” to use Justice Lushington’s 
phrase from Deane v Aveling.231
In the end, defining “WOMAN” and “MAN” for the purpose of defining marriage as the 
union of one man and one woman comes down to the sex act. Sex, like race, is a social 
construct.
I close by going back to Justice Lushington’s opinion in Deane v Aveling where he wrote
I apprehend that we are all agreed that, in order to constitute the marriage bond 
between young persons, there must be the power, present or to come, of sexual 
intercourse. Without that power, neither of the two principal ends of matrimony 
can be attained, namely, a lawful indulgence of the passions to prevent 
licentiousness, and the procreation of children, according to the evident design of 
Divine Providence.232
The argument set forth in this Article has said remarkably little about sexual activities. I 
find it highly ironic that it is the traditionalist opponents of universal marriage who feel 
compelled to introduce the issue of sexual activity. Of course, they do this when they 
argue that only sexual acts that are reproductive in kind can consummate a marriage and, 
therefore, only these sexual acts are ethically valid. In so doing they continue to cling to 
the first of Lushington’s “principal ends of matrimony,” namely, the “lawful indulgence 
of the [sexual] passions to prevent licentiousness.”233 For better or worse, “lawful” sex is 
no longer confined to marriage.
Surely, all of the physical incapacity cases on record involved spouses, usually husbands, 
who chose to go to court to get out of their marriages.234 No law compelled them to seek 
an annulment.235 They sought the easiest way possible to get out of their marriages when 
231 D-e v A-g, 1 Rob Eccl at 298.
232
 Id.
233
 Id.
234
 Alice Dreger reports the case of a Madame X of Angers. She too, had undoubtedly experienced 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome during gestation. Her parents felt that it would be dishonest for her to 
marry young given her undoubted infertility (made evident by her failure to menstruate). In 1898 at age 44 
she received a marriage proposal from a 60 year old widower who found her sterility a “selling point.” 
Dreger writes
Try as he might, Monsieur X could not penetrate his new wife to the depth he desired, and his 
attempts caused her some pain. The two, however, did not find the situation entirely unsatisfying: 
“she felt voluptuous sensations when ejaculation was produced in her husband, [and] these 
sensations reached their climax in the form of rhythmic spasms accompanied by a shaking of the 
whole body and an emission of sticky liquid in the area of the vulva.” (Alice Domurat Dreger, 
Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex 124-125 (Harvard 1998))
Monsieur X did not seek an annulment. When Madame X discovered two “tumors” in her labia majora 
following a fall she sought the advice of Dr. Raoul Blondel in Paris. She also asked him whether he could 
enable more complete sexual connection with her husband. In spite of the fact that he immediately 
recognized the “tumors” to be undescended testes, Dr. Blondel proposed surgery to section her hymen and 
elongate her vagina. For some reason Madame X failed to have the surgery. (Id)
235
 Nor did a third party ever have standing to seek an annulment for the physical incapacity of one of the 
spouses.
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divorce was well nigh impossible. Court opinions don’t always provide the petitioner’s 
motivation for seeking an annulment for physical incapacity. Nevertheless, we can be 
certain that many, if not most of the spouses who sought an annulment were motivated by 
a desire to indulge their sexual passions.236
Although sexual activity that is reproductive in kind may be an implicit part of the 
marriage contract it is not mandatory and can be waived by the mutual prior knowledge 
and consent of the parties.237 Even the traditionalists know that sexual consummation 
provides no more than an immediate abrogation of one ground for annulment and an 
236
 In a 1951 New Jersey case (Donati v Church, 13 NJ Super 454, 80 A2d 633) the imperfectly gratified 
husband tried to have it both ways. His wife’s vagina was “infantile in type and too small to allow of 
copulation, although her husband was able to, and did frequently, insert the tip of his penis.” (Id.) He sued 
for an annulment on grounds of physical incapacity yet continued to cohabitate with his wife and “they had 
sexual intercourse of the kind and to the extent that her condition permitted . . . as late as two weeks before 
the final hearing. The conduct of the plaintiff toward the defendant can be defended only by reason of the 
marriage relation between them, and clearly constituted a ratification of the marriage.” (Id at 634.)
In a 1992 South Carolina case (EDM v TDM, 207 SC 471, 415 SE2d 812) the wife brought suit for divorce. 
The “husband counterclaimed for an annulment of the marriage on the ground of fraud alleging Wife 
concealed her psychological problems and resulting sexual incapacity.” (Id SE2d at 814.) The South 
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Greenville County Family Court that “Husband 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence he was entitled to an annulment on the ground of 
fraudulent inducement. Moreover, despite Husband's assertions to the contrary, the parties' marriage was 
consummated by cohabitation and therefore §20-1-530 bars an annulment even if fraud were proved in 
this case.” (Id at 815, emphasis added.) The court noted that “It is undisputed the parties never had penile-
vaginal intercourse before or after their marriage in 1985. The extent of their sexual activity was infrequent 
oral sex performed by Husband upon Wife” (id at 814) and noted that “This Court has never viewed actual 
sexual intercourse as distinguishable from other sexual activity in determining marital matters.” (Id at 815.) 
(Prior to Lawrence v Texas South Carolina criminalized anal-genital sex (“buggery” see SC Code Ann §16-
15-120 (Law Co-op (2003)) but not oral-genital sex.)
Bradley and George argue that “This requirement [physical capacity for sexual intercourse] for the validity 
of a marriage, where in force, has never been treated as satisfied by an act of sodomy, no matter how 
pleasurable. Nothing less (or more) than an act of genital union consummates a marriage.” (Bradley and 
George, 84 Georgetown L J at 308, cited at n___.) . Bradley and George are correct that only acts of genital 
union demonstrate the physical capacity conclusively. Strictly speaking, EDM v TDM does not invalidate 
their claim just presented. How could it? In South Carolina marriages are consummated by cohabitation. 
Nevertheless, the court statements in EDM v TDM (and Donati v Church) should give them pause to reflect 
on the distinction between physical incapacity and marital consummation.
237
 “A person who enters into the solemn contract of marriage, in the full knowledge that the implied 
condition of potency on the part of the other partner (a condition which would otherwise have entitled him 
or her to resolve the contract) can never be fulfilled, is barred by his or her own act of adoption or 
homolgation from founding on such non-fulfilment as a ground for resolving it. . . . [It] is no more than a 
condition of the contract which the party (who would otherwise be aggrieved by its non-fulfilment) can 
waive without rendering the marriage invalid. (” (L v L, [1931] SC 477, 481) In this case from the Scottish 
Court of Sessions a woman married a man whose paralysis rendered him impotent in order to legitimate an 
illegitimate child fathered by someone else. After four years of cohabitation she sued for an annulment. The 
court held “that she was barred from founding on the defender’s impotency, in respect that she entered into 
the marriage in knowledge of it, and that, in the circumstances of the case, it would be inequitable to allow 
her to found upon it.” (Id at 477.)
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immediate ratification238 of marital rights and obligations, a ratification subject to divorce 
at a later date.
A reading of the physical incapacity cases reveals a body of jurisprudence recognizing 
another method of ratifying a marriage: staying together in the marriage.239 As physical 
238
 New Jersey law states ”The parties, or either of them, were at the time of marriage physically and 
incurably impotent, provided the party making the application shall have been ignorant of such impotency 
or incapability at the time of the marriage, and has not subsequently ratified the marriage.” (NJ Rev Stat § 
2A:34-1c. “Causes for judgments of nullity”)
In Godfrey v Shatwell Judge Conford wrote
I am, moreover, convinced that the marriage has been ratified by the plaintiff with knowledge of 
the material facts. I find he was informed, in substance, of the condition of his wife in respect to 
sexual incapacity and as to the state of the prospects for her cure, and that he nevertheless 
cohabited with the defendant with the desire and intent to affirm his marital relationship. By his 
own admission he vigorously besought her return on both of the occasions when she assertedly left 
him, and he expressed his love and desire for her return to him as late as his appearance as a 
witness at the trial, explaining he was willing to take his chances on the eventual restoration of her 
wifely capacity. While these expressions are laudable, they evidence an unequivocal attitude of 
affirmation of the marriage, which, in effect, is a ratification thereof and precludes relief under 
the statute. I do not mean to imply that mere cohabitation after knowledge is necessarily 
ratification. Cohabitation for a reasonable time with the intent solely to ascertain if the impotence 
is incurable might be distinguishable. But here the cohabitation appears to me to have been in 
unqualified and unconditional affirmance of the marriage. The shortness of the period does not 
necessarily preclude a finding of ratification where the other evidence is weighty. I am constrained 
to find that plaintiff filed this action to rid himself of the defendant after he was finally satisfied
she did not intend to return, because she deserted him, not because she was incurably impotent. 
(Godfrey v Shatwell, NJ Super 501,508-9, 119 A2d 479,483 (1956) Emphasis added)
 Judge Conford denied the husband’s petition for an annulment for physical incapacity.
239
 Staying together in the marriage does not even require that the parties cohabitate. The 1944 case of 
Anonymous v Anonymous (49 NYS 2d 314, Supreme Court, Bronx County) tells a tragic story. In this case 
an orthodox Jewish man and woman went through a civil ceremony in August 1940 intending to have a 
religious ceremony several months later. “[B]oth parties . . . agreed that the ceremony was not to be 
considered valid and binding and the marriage was not to be consummated until a religious ceremony was 
performed.” (Id at 315.) They disclosed their marriage to only their closest friends and family, lived with 
their respective parents and according to the husband did not consummate the marriage sexually. Two 
months after their civil marriage the wife suffered a severe spinal injury while making wedding plans at the 
synagogue. This left her paralyzed and put in doubt her ability to perform “the marital act.” For nearly 3 
years the husband remained a dutiful husband while the wife was hospitalized.
The husband himself, by numerous acts, acknowledged the validity and the binding effect of the civil 
ceremony and of the marital status established thereby. In his dealings with the hospitals in which his 
wife was cared for, in his income tax returns, his registration for selective service, in communications 
had at his instance with his draft board, in his suit for the injury sustained by his wife in which he 
asserted his claim as the husband for loss of consortium, in his application to the Navy, in which he 
now serves, for an allotment to his wife--in all these and in other ways he avowed the marriage to be 
valid and subsistent. (Id at 316, emphasis added.)
In 1943 the husband fell in love with another woman. When he asked to be released from the marriage his 
wife refused “at least until the war was over.” (Id at 317.) Not being satisfied with that answer the husband 
sought to have the marriage annulled.
The basis of the husband's complaint is that the parties agreed that the civil ceremony was not to be 
considered valid unless and until a religious ceremony was performed; that the marriage was, in fact, 
never consummated; that as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, the wife became 
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incapacity suits proliferated, many American and English courts added two requirements 
before granting an annulment: “sincerity and promptness.”240 Courts have more often 
than not refused to grant annulments for non-consummation to petitioners who have 
physically incapable of consummating the marriage, of performing the marital act; and for the plaintiff, 
under the circumstances, to go through a religious ceremony would be the performance of a futile act 
and the ceremony itself would be an idle one. 'The defendant', he urges, 'cannot be a wife to the 
plaintiff in every sense of the word nor can she fulfill the obligations of a true marriage.' (Id at 315.)
At the trial the wife testified that they had in fact sexually consummated their marriage after the civil 
ceremony. (Id at 316) A medical examiner testified that in spite of her paralysis “the wife, from a medical 
standpoint, was capable of performing the marital act” but raised doubts about her psychological capability 
to perform the marital act. (Id at 319.)
On appeal Judge Shentag did not need to deal with these questions of fact. He held that there was a valid 
marriage even if there had been no sexual activity following the civil ceremony and even if the wife were 
incapable of performing the marital act. (Id at 317.)
By his tender devotion for almost three years to his stricken wife, his invariably regular and 
frequent visits to her in the hospital, his endearing letters of love and encouragement and faith in 
their ultimate happiness, he recognized that they were, in fact as in law, truly wedded husband and 
wife. (Id at 316.)
He had ratified the marriage.
240
 In G v G (67 NJ Eq 30, 56 A 736 (1903)) a New Jersey court refused to grant an annulment sought by an 
adulterous (i.e. “insincere”) wife accused of adultery 30 years into her unconsummated marriage.
Twelve states now specify strict statutory limits after which an annulment suit on the grounds of physical 
incapacity can no longer be commenced. Within 90 days of learning of the incapacity: Kentucky - Ky Rev 
Stat Ann § 403-120.(2).2 (Banks-Baldwin 2003). Within 1 year of learning of the incapacity: Colorado -
Colo Rev Stat § 14-10-111(2)(b) (2003); Delaware - 13:15 Dela Code Ann § 1506(2) (2003); Wisconsin -
Wis Stat § 767.03(2) (2003). Within 2 years of the marriage ceremony: Hawaii - Hawaii Rev Stat § 580-28
(2003); Michigan - Mich Comp Laws § 552.39 (2003); Vermont - 15-11 Vt Stat Ann § 515 (2003); 
Virginia - Va Code Ann § 20-89.1(b) (Michie 2003), Wyoming - Wyo Stat § 20-2-101(f) (2003). Within 4 
years of the marriage ceremony: South Dakota - SD Cod Laws §25-3-8 (Michie 2003). Within 4 years of 
learning of the incapacity: Montana within - Mont Code Ann § 40-1-402(2)(d) (2003). Within 5 years of 
the marriage ceremony: New York - NY Domestic Relations Law § 14-9-140(D) (Consol 2003). In 
addition Texas requires that “the petitioner has not voluntarily cohabited with the other party since learning 
of the impotency.” Tex Family Code Ann § 6.106(3) (2003).
At the other end of the continuum in 1985 a Pennsylvania Superior Court granted an annulment on the 
grounds of incurable impotence to a husband after 24 years of marriage sexually unconsummated with his 
wife.
The sexual problems in this unhappy union commenced on the honeymoon and have persisted for 
the last twenty-four years. When husband tried to confide his desires to his bride a thousand or so 
times, the object of his love quest told him to "knock it off" or that she was tired and didn't feel 
good. However, hope resided abundant in husband's emotional reservoir and he persisted 
throughout twenty-four years, or two hundred eighty-eight months to attempt to cement their 
union in a concrete manner. Vain and fruitless were his attempts for his wife's reluctance or sexual 
short- circuit could not be overcome and she remained insurmountable and to him, her problems-
impenetrable and inscrutable. It is an instance of: "The spirit is unwilling though the flesh be 
strong". (Manbeck v Manbeck, 339 Pa Super 493,500, 489 A2d 748,751)
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enjoyed the benefits of marriage.241 Beyond that we can only guess at how many 
marriages have remained unconsummated whether between “old persons” taking each 
other “as sister or as brother”242 to generalize Justice Nicholl in Brown v Brown or 
between “young persons”  to use Justice Lushington’s term.
The state may allow “young persons” to have their marriage annulled because it has 
never been consummated by a sexual act that is reproductive in kind. However, no state 
has ever compelled any couple to consummate their marriage by a sexual act of any 
kind.243 At the end of his opinion in the landmark 1965 case Griswold v Connecticut
overturning state laws banning contraceptive use by married couples Justice Douglas 
wrote
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for 
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions 
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.244
If the state cannot enter the marital bedroom to search for contraceptives it can hardly be 
conceived to have to right to enter the marital bedroom to seek evidence of 
consummation.245 Imagine the comedic potential of requiring eighty year olds to prove 
241
 In Kirschbaum v Kirschbaum (92 NJ Eq 7, 111 A 697 (1920)) Lena Kirschbaum sued Abraham 
Kirschbaum for an annulment on the grounds of physical incapacity 11 years after they married. Citing 
“sincerity and promptness” as the two prerequisites for an annulment suit, Chancellor Walker declared
I have no hesitation in pronouncing in this case that where, as here, the wife has accepted and 
enjoyed the benefits, such as they may be, of a merely platonic marriage for upwards of 11 years, 
she cannot be permitted to repudiate the contract, but must be held to have ratified it by conduct 
[waiting to sue] which she in no wise explains. (Id at A 701)
Given the usual economic asymmetry between husband and wife nineteenth and early twentieth century 
courts showed a decided bias toward husbands, usually denying annulments to wives while granting them 
to husbands. In the case of E- v T- (falsely called E-), 3 Swab T 312 (1863), an English court granted an 
annulment to a husband who waited 11 years to sue for annulment commenting that “He behaved in a most 
manly and considerate way.” However, in Peipho v Peipho (88 Ill 438 (1878)) an Illinois court refused to 
grant an annulment for physical incapacity to a husband who had lived with his wife for 8 years (and then 
been separated for 5 more years.)
242
 “For instance, could it be maintained that either husband or wife could at the age of eighty set aside their 
marriage on the ground that one of the two parties had sixty years ago been visited with an affliction or 
mal-conformation? The law would surely hold that the complaint was, according to Lord Stowell’s 
expression ‘insincere,’ that the party complaining has made his or her election to abide by the contract, and 
would apply the canonist’s maxim ‘Habeat tanquam soror vel tanquam frater.’ The law would be very 
inhuman if it allowed the husband after a long cohabitation, without any satisfactory explanation of the 
delay, to throw his wife in her middle or old age, with ignominy, shame, and poverty, upon the world 
because she had been originally, however innocently, by physical causes incapacitated from performing 
some of the duties of the married state.” W, falsely called R, v R, 1 L R Prob Division 405,407-408 (1876)
243
“This court has no jurisdiction in any case to enforce the performance of her marriage vows.” 
(Devanbagh v Devanbagh, 6 Paige 175,178 (NY Chancery 1836).)
244 Griswold, 379 US at 485-6.
245
 In the recently decided case of Standhardt v Arizona, that upheld the state’s same-sex marriage ban, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals wrote
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that they have consummated their marriage! Imagine the outrage that would be generated 
if the wife of a veteran with a grievous uro-genital war wound had to provide evidence of 
consummation!
If the state cannot compel a couple to consummate their marriage with a sexual act that is 
reproductive in kind how can the inability to perform that act stand in the way of a couple 
marrying? It should not. As Justice Nicholl understood in 1828, there is more than one 
model for marriage.
Allowing all opposite-sex couples to enter marriage under Arizona law, regardless of their 
willingness or ability to procreate, does not defeat the reasonableness of the link between 
opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child rearing. First, if the State excluded opposite-sex 
couples from marriage based on their intention or ability to procreate, the state would have to 
inquire about that subject before issuing a license, thereby implicating constitutionally rooted 
privacy concerns. (Standhardt v Arizona, No 1 CA-SA 03-0150 slip op at ¶36 (Ariz Court of 
Appeals, Div 1 (Oct 8, 2003))
citing exactly the same portion of Griswold! Slightly earlier in the opinion we read
Because the State’s interest in committed sexual relationships is limited to those capable of 
producing children, it contends it reasonably restricts marriage to opposite-sex couples. (Id at 
¶33, emphasis added.)
Of course, we have seen above that Arizona is one of three states that allow first cousins to marry only if 
one of them is sterile! This first cousin exception is Ariz Rev Stat §25-101-B (2003). The very next statute 
on the books, Ariz Rev Stat §25-101-C (2003), is the same-sex marriage ban. (“Marriage between persons 
of the same sex is void and prohibited.”) How the Arizona Court of Appeals could claim that Arizona limits 
marriage only to couples capable of producing children is a subject for further research.
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Appendix - A BRIEF SURVEY OF PHYSICALLY INTERSEXED CONDITIONS
This Article focuses on the first four of the eight sexual characteristics presented in the 
Introduction.
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex (also called karyotype)—typically XX or XY; but 
there are many other variations 246
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands)-- ovaries or testes (or ovotestes);
3. Internal morphologic sex --- uterus/fallopian tubes/upper vagina or 
prostrate/seminal vesicles/vas deferens/epididymis; 
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia)-- clitoris/labia or penis/scrotum.
These characteristics are present at birth (and at a post mortem following death!)
The great 20th century endocrinologist Alfred Jost recognized
After a period of embryogenesis preceding the appearance of any sexual structure, 
the different sexual characters appear during three successive periods of 
development:
(a) The sexual differentiation of the gonads, starting from an 
undifferentiated primordium. … The complete organogenesis of the 
gonads, especially of the ovary, overlaps the following phase. 
(b) The differentiation of the genital tract (“somatic sexual 
differentiation”) comprises the alternative development or 
retrogression of the double assortment of sex ducts, and the 
specialization of the common primordial (urogenital sinus, external 
genitalia). . . .
(c) Rapid appearance of the secondary sexual characters at puberty, 
preceded by the slow modeling of the corporeal forms from birth.247
We are concerned with the first two of these phases, the phases that occur during 
gestation.
A. Preliminaries
In introductory biology we learned that an XX pair of sex chromosomes produces a 
female and an XY pair produces a male. That is not always so. We should also remember 
from introductory biology that chromosomes only act as whole units during mitosis and 
meiosis. Aside from these cell division activities chromosomes are merely structures that 
246
 The chromosomal composition of humans (and other species) is denoted by giving first the number of 
chromosomes followed by the karyotype and any extra chromosomes. For example, a human being with a 
typical set of chromosomes would be denoted as “46,XX” or “46,XY”. Someone with Trisomy 21 (Down’s 
Syndrome) would be denoted as 47,XY,+21.
247
 Jost, 8 Recent Progress in Hormone Research at 383 (cited in note ___).
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carry genes: much smaller units. Genes and hormones hold the key to understanding 
interactions that occur along the developmental pathways.
All human fetuses initially develop two primordial structures called the gonadal ridge
and the genital ridge from the mesonephric ridge near the primitive kidneys.248 The 
gonadal ridge develops into ovaries, testes, or ovotestes.249 The genital ridge contains 
three structures that develop into male or female form.
• The genital tubercle develops into the clitoris or the penis.
• The urethrolabial fold develops into the inner labia or the skin on the shaft of the 
penis.
• The labioscrotal swelling develops into the outer labia or the scrotum.250
 In addition, all human fetuses initially develop both a set of Müllerian ducts, the 
precursor of the internal female sex organs (uterus, fallopian tubes, upper vagina) and the 
Wolffian ducts, the precursor of the internal male sex organs (prostate, seminal vesicles, 
vas deferens, and epididymis.)251 The developmental paths taken by these structures all 
depend on production and detection of the appropriate hormones. Once we realize the 
existence of these common precursor forms it becomes easier to understand that are not 
two distinct paths to sexual development but many paths on a tree with many branches.
It is easier to begin with the paths typically taken.
B. Paths Along the Branches Leading to Typical Suites of Sexual Characteristics
Here is the path along the branches leading to a typical suite of male characteristics.
In the presence of a Y chromosome each side of the gonadal ridge develops into a testis 
during the 7th week of gestation.252 During the next few weeks the testes secrete two 
hormones that play a key role in the development of sexual characteristics. The Leydig 
cells in the testes produce testosterone, which stimulates the development of the Wolffian 
ducts into the prostate gland, seminal vesicles, vas deferens, and epididymis.253 The 
Sertoli cells in the testes produce the “Müllerian Inhibiting Substance” (MIS), which, as 
its name implies, inhibits the development of the Müllerian ducts into the uterus, 
fallopian tubes, and upper vagina.254
248
 T. W. Sadler, Langman’s Medical Embryology 286-288 (Williams & Wilkins, 7th ed, 1995).
249
 Id at 287-291.
250
 Id at 298-301.
251
 Id at 291-298. The epididymis is a duct that connects a testis to a vas deferens.
252
 A decade ago it was though that the Y chromosome contained a gene called the SRY gene (for “Sex 
determining Region of the Y chromosome”) that produced a substance functionally named the “Testis 
Determining Factor,” hereinafter “TDF.” (See for example id at 286, which speaks of the SRY gene and 
TDF.). Although the SRY gene has been identified, TDF has not been. Over the last decade researchers 
have learned that testis determination is much more complex. See below, Appendix section E.3. 
253
 Id at 292.
254
 Mary M. Lee and Patricia K. Donahoe, Müllerian Inhibiting Substance: A Gonadal Hormone With 
Multiple Functions, 14 Endocrine Reviews 152 (1993). The testes continue to produce MIS after regression 
of the Müllerian ducts is complete, remains high after birth and then decreases significantly at puberty. In 
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An enzyme called 5-alpha-reductase 2 encoded by a gene on an autosome (i.e. a 
chromosome other than a sex chromosome) converts testosterone into another male 
hormone called dihydrotestosterone, more commonly called “DHT” and more commonly 
known from male baldness later in life! DHT acts on the genital ridge causing the genital 
tubercle to elongate into the penis, the urethrolabial fold to enclose the urethra in the 
penis, and the labioscrotal swelling to fuse and form the scrotum.255
Here is the path along the branches leading to a typical suite of female characteristics.
contrast, ovarian production of MIS by the granulose cells begins after birth and peaks during puberty and 
adult years. It appears that MIS plays many more functions than just inhibition of the Müllerian ducts. (Id 
at 152-153.)
255
 Sadler, Medical Embryology at 292,310.
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(From Money 1994, p.38 NEED PERMISSION)
In the absence of a Y chromosome the gonads remain in an undeveloped state until the 
13th week of gestation when they develop into ovaries under the influence of an as yet 
unidentified factor presumed to be on the X chromosomes.256  In the absence of the 
Müllerian Inhibiting Substance the Müllerian ducts develop into the uterus, fallopian 
tubes, and upper vagina.257 Without androgens present the Wolffian ducts shrivel up.258
256
 Id at 290-291.
257
 Id at 292-298.
258
 Id at 292.
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The absence of testosterone also prevents production of DHT. In the absence of DHT the 
genital tubercle remains relatively small and develops into the clitoris, the urethrolabial 
fold stays open and becomes the inner labia, and the labioscrotal swelling remains 
unfused and becomes the outer labia.259
These days, when many of us learn the sex of our not-yet-born by sonogram, it may be 
difficult to remember how cursory a glance usually determines a newborn’s sex in the 
delivery room. But is anyone really observing the newborn’s sex? No. They are 
observing the newborn’s external genital appearance and drawing an inference that the 
other sexual characteristics are now in alignment and will continue to be in alignment, 
even the purely anatomical characteristics. Chromosome tests are not normally run and 
the presence of ovaries is not checked. Having seen the directions taken at the several 
forks in the fetus’s developmental path we are now in a better position to appreciate the 
forks less typically taken and the fragility of declaring “It’s a girl!” or “It’s a boy!”
C. Paths Along Branches Less Often Taken Following Gonadal Differentiation
It is now time to consider forks less typically taken in the path to the development of 
sexual characteristics present at birth. These forks lead to atypical suites of sexual 
characteristics. The following table summarizes the information to be presented.
259
 Id at 292,302-305.
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Condition
Rate per 
Thousand 
Live 
Births
Chromo-
somes Gonads Genitals
Müllerian 
Duct 
Derivatives
Wolffian 
Duct 
Derivatives
Turner 
Syndrome 0.3690 X0
streak 
ovaries vagina y n
Congenital 
Adrenal 
Hyperplasia 0.0770 XX ovaries penis y n
Meyer-
Rokitansky-
Küster-Hauser 
Syndrome 0.1694 XX ovaries vagina n n
XX male 0.0250 XX testes penis n y
XY female 0.0250 XY ovaries vagina y n
Persistent 
Müllerian Duct 
Syndrome n/a XY testes penis y y
17ß-
Hydroxysteroid 
Dehydrogenase-
3 Deficiency 0.0068 XY testes vagina n y
Complete 
Androgen 
Insensitivity 
Syndrome 0.0101 XY testes vagina n y
5-Reductase 2 
Deficiency n/a XY testes vagina n y
Klinefelter 
Syndrome 0.9220 XXY testes penis n y
total 1.6043
(For the moment we will continue to suppose that testes develop in response to the 
presence of a Y chromosome and that ovaries develop in response to the absence of a Y 
chromosome.)
1. 17ß-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency
Testosterone production in the Leydig cells of the testes plays a key role in the 
development of male genital tract characteristics. Testosterone production is the final step 
of a multi-stage process that begins with the breakdown of cholesterol and ends with the 
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conversion of androstenedione260 into testosterone. The enzyme 17ß-Hydroxysteroid 
dehydrogenase-3 (17ßHSD3) enables this conversion.261
17ß-Hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase-3 deficiency results from a mutation to the 17ßHSD3 
gene on an autosome.262 In the absence of sufficient quantities of 17ßHSD3 relatively 
little testosterone gets produced during gestation and the external genitalia take female 
form.263
• The genital tubercle takes on a clitoral appearance. (It may be enlarged.) 
• The urethrolabial fold develops into the inner labia.
• The labio-scrotal swelling remains unfused.
• A blind-ended [lower] vagina forms.264
In contrast, the internal morphological characteristics take masculine form. The 
production of MIS in the Sertoli cells inhibits the development of the Müllerian ducts into 
the uterus, fallopian tubes, and upper vagina. However, the Wolffian ducts develop into 
the prostate, seminal vesicles, vas deferens, and epididymis in response to 
androstenedione.265 The testes remain undescended in the inguinal canals or labia 
majora.266
Standard medical practice suggests removal of the testes shortly after early diagnosis of 
cases with complete female external genitalia and raising these children as girls.267 They 
will never menstruate.
In the absence of intervention virilization occurs at puberty and is probably due to 
extratesticular conversion of androstenedione to testosterone.268 The skin of the labia 
majora becomes rugged, the clitoris enlarges (>3cm), male pattern body hair may emerge 
and the voice may lower.269 Gender role reversal occurs in about half of these 
individuals.270
260
 The steroid Mark McGwire admitted taking.
261
 Wayne M. Geissler, et al, Male Pseudohemaphroditism Caused by Mutations of Testicular 17-
Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase 3 7 Nature Genetics 34 (1994).
262
 Annemie L. M. Boehmer et al, 17ß-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency: Diagnosis, 
Phenotypic Variability, Population Genetics, and Worldwide Distribution of Ancient and de Novo 
Mutations, 84 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 4713,4714 (1999). 17ß-Hydroxysteroid 
dehydrogenase-3 deficiency is asymptomatic in persons with XX karyotype. (Id.)
263
 Stefan Andersson et al, Molecular Genetics and Pathophysiology of 17-Hydroxysteroid 
Dehydrogenase 3 Deficiency, 81 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 130,134 (1996).
264
 Boehmer et al, 84 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism at 4714 (cited in note ___).
265
 Id.
266
 Andersson et al, 81 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism at 134 (cited in note ___)..
267
 Boehmer et al, 84 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism at 4714 (cited in note ___).
268
 Id at 4715.
269
 Id.
270
 Jean D. Wilson, The Role of Androgens in Male Gender Role Behavior, 20 Endocrine Reviews 726,730 
(1999).
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A recent study estimates the naturally occurring rate of 17ßHSD3 deficiency to be 
1:147,000 based on analysis of the Dutch population.271 However, among the Arabs in 
Gaza, who frequently intermarry, the incidence is as high as 1:200-300.272
2. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome
Throughout this Article we have seen many cases involving wives who may have 
experienced what is now recognized as Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome
(cAIS).273 The Yale gynecologist James McLean Morris gave the first complete 
description of cAIS in 1953.
There is a clinically recognizable syndrome found in patients who are essentially 
normally appearing women, but who have undescended testes in place of ovaries. 
. . .These patients present a fairly typical clinical picture. For this reason they have 
been singled out from the other forms of intersexuality, and we have called the 
clinical syndrome “testicular feminization.”
The outstanding characteristics of this syndrome are:
1. Female habitus with normal female fat deposits. In some cases the build 
has a eunuchoid tendency with long extremities and large hands and feet.
2. Normal female breasts, often with a tendency to be “overdeveloped,” 
although the nipples are sometimes juvenile.
3. Absent or scanty axillary and pubic hair in the majority of cases. The may 
be a slight amount of vulvar hair. The hair on the head is that of a normal 
female without temporal recession, but the facial hair is more often absent 
as in a child.
4. Female external genitals. The labia may be underdeveloped, especially the 
labia minora. The clitoris is normal or small. The vagina ends blindly, but 
is usually adequate for marital relations.
5. Absence of internal genitals except for rudimentary uterine and other 
anlage, including sometimes Fallopian tubes or spermatic ducts, and for 
the gonads, which may be intra-abdominal or may lie along the course of 
the inguinal canal.
6. Gonads consisting largely of seminiferous tubules usually without 
spermatogenesis, but in most cases with a marked increase of interstitial 
cells….
271 Boehmer et al, 84 J Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism at 4717 (cited in note ___).
272
 Id at 4718.
273
 One commentator has suggested that Queen Elizabeth I experienced cAIS. (R. Bakan, Queen Elizabeth 
I: A Case of Testicular Feminization?, 17 Medical Hypotheses 277 (1985).) The evidence presented is 
intriguing but circumstantial. Unfortunately, no evidence is given about Anne Boleyn’s family. We can 
only speculate whether Henry VIII made inquiries about whether there were patterns of infertility on 
Anne’s mother’s side of her family.
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7. Hormone assays in a limited number of cases suggest that these testes 
produce both estrogen and androgen. The pituitary gonadotropins have 
been elevated in some instances.274
He also cited 82 cases that had appeared in the medical literature beginning with an 1817 
case.275
Morris labeled the condition “Testicular Feminization” since he conjectured that the 
testes produced an insufficient quantity of androgens to masculinize the body.276
Subsequent research has demonstrated that cAIS is the result of the body’s inability to 
process androgens, not its inability to produce them.277 Morris had noted “a strong 
familial tendency as shown by the number of sisters with the same findings.”278 The 
discovery that the gene coding for androgen receptor capability resides on the X 
chromosome279 readily explains this hereditary phenomenon. cAIS results from a point 
mutation to this gene.280
At birth an XY cAIS baby has the genital appearance of a typical XX baby and is 
assigned to the female sex. Questions sometimes arise before puberty if undescended 
testes are discovered. Suspicions more frequently arise when menstruation fails to occur 
during the teen years. Examination reveals the absence of ovaries and uterus. A short, 
blind-ended vagina confirms the suspicions.281 Nor is a prostate to be found. Only 
remnants of the original Wolffian ducts remain.282
274
 John McLean Morris, The Syndrome of Testicular Feminization in Male Pseudohermaphrodites, 65 Am 
J Obstetrics & Gynecology 1192-1193 (1953).
275
 Id at 1194-1197. The first British case was reported in 1879-80.
276
 Id at 1206.
277
 See generally Charmian A. Quigley, et al, Androgen Receptor Defects: Historical, Clinical and 
Molecular Perspectives, 16 Endocrine Reviews 271 (1995).
278
 Morris, 65 Am J Obstetrics & Gynecology at 1193 (cited in note___). A Talmudic passage (order 
Nashim, tractate Ketubot, 10b, ~400AD) reads
A man came before Rabbi Gamaliel the Elder and said to him, “Rabbi, I have had intercourse with 
my wife and no virginal blood resulted.” So the wife said to the Rabbi, “I am from the family 
Dorkati, where the women have neither menstrual flow not virginal bleeding.” Rabbi Gamaliel 
examined her family and verified what she had stated.
Goodman suggests that this is a description of a family with a pattern of cAIS. (Richard M. Goodman (ed), 
Genetic Disorders of the Jewish People 65-66 (Johns Hopkins 1979).)
279
 J. A. Spencer, et al, The Androgen Receptor Gene Is Located on a Highly Conserved Region of the X 
Chromosomes of Marsupial and Monotreme as Well as Eutherian Mammals, 82 J Heredity 134 (1991).
280
 Quigley, et al, 16 Endocrine Reviews at 272-274,295 (cited in note ___).The Androgen Receptor gene 
(“AR”) is the only steroid receptor gene found on the X chromosome. (Id.) “This X-chromosmal location 
of a gene as vitally important as that encoding the AR is intriguing. Why did a gene so crucial for the 
survival of the species end up in such a precarious position in all classes of mammals, unprotected by 
pairing with a matching chromosome? Perhaps, contrary to first appearances, this is in fact protective of 
reproductive fitness: because of its X-chromosomal location, mutations in this gene, by impairing 
reproductive capacity, are genetically lethal in males, reducing by one-third the accumulation of deleterious 
mutant AR gene alleles.”  (Id at 310-311.)
281
 In about one third of subjects there is incomplete Müllerian duct regression. One hypothesis advanced to 
explain this finding is that the highly estrogenic milieu of the Müllerian ducts in an androgen-insensitive 
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Half a century ago Morris reported “The sex urges of the patient are usually the same as 
those of other women, an indication that the seat of the libido is more in the psyche than 
in the gonads. The urge for childbearing is strong and some of the married patients have 
sought medical advice for sterility.”283
A recent study estimates the naturally occurring rate of cAIS to be 1:99,000 based on an 
analysis of the Dutch population.284 A 1992 Danish study estimated the naturally 
occurring rate to be 1:20,400.285
Mutations that result in impaired but not total androgen processing result in Partial 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (pAIS). A fetus experiencing pAIS is able to process 
some but not all androgen produced. Consequently, the phallus can take on a penis-like or 
a clitoris-like appearance and the labioscrotal swelling may fuse into a scrotum or remain 
unfused as the outer labia.
3. 5-Reductase 2 Deficiency
Inheriting two copies of recessive forms of the SRD5A2 gene on chromosome 2 results in 
a failure to produce the enzyme 5-reductase-2.286 When 5--Reductase 2 deficiency
occurs the fetal body fails to convert testosterone into DHT, whose absence results in 
predominately female external genitalia at birth with a male ejaculatory system that 
terminates in a blind-ending vagina.287 The degree of virilization at the onset of puberty 
can be striking though less masculine than in unaffected brothers.288 The voice deepens, 
muscle mass grows substantially (due to an abundance of testosterone) and a functional 
penis capable of ejaculation develops from what had been considered a clitoris. However, 
the prostrate remains small and beard growth remains light.289
5-Reductase 2 deficiency occurs with regularity in at least four isolated populations in 
New Guinea (6:1,000),290 the Dominican Republic (1:90),291 Brazil,292 and Turkey.293
The Dominican and New Guinea populations have been studied extensively.
fetus (due to conversion of testosterone to estrogen) interferes with the action of the anti-Müllerian 
hormone. (Id at 284).
282Annemie L. M. Boehmer, et al, Genotype Versus Phenotype in Families with Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome, 86 J Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism 4151 (2001).
283
 Morris, 65 Am J Obstetrics & Gynecology at 1209 (cited in note___).It should be noted that the brains 
of persons experiencing cAIS do not respond to androgens and as a result do not masculinize.
284
 Boehmer et al, 86 J Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism  at 4153 (cited in note ___).
285
 Quigley, et al, 16 Endocrine Reviews at 279 (cited in note ___).
286
 Jean D. Wilson, James E. Griffin, and David W. Russell, Steroid 5-Reductase 2 Deficiency, 14 
Endocrine Reviews 577,581(1993)
287
 Berenice B. Mendonca, et al, Male Pseudohermaphroditism Due to Steroid 5-Reductase 2 Deficiency, 
75 Medicine 64,71 (1996).
288
 Wilson, Griffin, and Russell, 14 Endocrine Reviews at 588 (cited in note ___).
289
 Julianne Imperato-Mcginley, et al, Steroid 5 -Reductase Deficiency in Man: An Inherited Form of Male 
Pseudohermaphroditism, 186 Science 1213 (27 December 1974).
290
 Gilbert H. Herdt and Julilan Davidson, The Sambia “Turnim Man: Sociocultural and Clinical Aspects of 
Gender Formation in Male Pseudohermaphrodites with 5-Alpha-Reductase Deficiency in a Turkish 
Village, 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior 33 (1988). See also J. Imperato-McGinley, et al, A Cluster of 
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The Sambia tribe of New Guinea was not pacified until 1964294 by which time 5-
Reductase 2 deficiency had been present long enough for explicit cultural responses to 
emerge.295 Sambia midwives always make sex assignments at birth and check for an odd-
looking vulva or clitoris as a sign of 5-Reductase 2 deficiency.296 Knowing that their 
masculine features are not yet apparent but will emerge at puberty these children are 
raised as neither aatmwul (male) or aambelu (female) but in a third category kwolu-
attmwol “a word that indexes to “male thing-transformed-into-female-thing,’”297 now 
called “turnim-man” in the pidgin English they have learned.298
Before the trait became established in the Dominican Republic the affected children were 
raised as girls.299 Now that trait is present in the third generation, the villagers sometimes 
raise these children as boys from birth or raise them first as girls and then as boys.300
When the condition is recognized the Dominican villages call such infants guevedoce, 
which literally means “penis at twelve!” or machihembra , which means “first woman, 
then man.”301
In western cultures much less familiar with these life trajectories such a child is judged to 
be a girl at birth. When masculine features emerge at puberty the young girl and her 
family usually find themselves unprepared for the available options. These include (a) 
continuing in a female sexual role with some male sexual features, (b) surgery and 
medical treatment to eliminate the male features, and (c) adopting a male sexual role302
Male Pseudohermaphroties in 5-Reductase Deficiency in Papua New Guinea, 34 Clinical Endocrinology 
293 (1991).
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 Imperato-Mcginley, et al, 186 Science at 1215 (cited in note ___).
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 Mendonca, et al, 75 Medicine at 64 (cited in note ___).
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 S. Akgun, et al, Familial Male Pseudohermaphroditism due to 5-Reductase Deficiency, 81 Am J Med 
267 (1986).
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 Herdt and Davidson, 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior at 35 (cited in note ___).
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 Id at 38.
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297
 Gilbert Herdt, Mistaken Gender: 5-Alpha Reductase Hermaphroditism and Biological Reductionism in 
Sexual Identity Reconsidered  92 Am Anthropologist 433,439 (1990).
298
 Herdt and Davidson, 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior at 38-41 (cited in note ___). A bit later Herdt 
wrote “My initial work with Sambia took a similar perspective in tacitly agreeing with them [many 
anthropologists] that the cultural construction of a third sex – the kwolu-aatmwol – as inexorable. 
Continuing field study has made me realize, however, that while Sambia recognize three sexes and at birth 
sex-assign them as such, their world view systematically codes only two genders, masculine and feminine 
in cultural discourse.” (Herdt, 92 Amer Anthropologist at 434.) For a contrary view that these children “are 
raised as normal males and regarded simply as having a birth defect” see J. Imperato-McGinley, et al, A 
Cluster of Male Pseudohermaphrodites in 5-Reductase Deficiency in Papua New Guinea, 34 Clinical 
Endocrinology 293,294 (1991). ). For our present purposes it is enough that these children are not raised as 
girls.
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 Imperato-Mcginley, et al, 186 Science at 1213 (cited in note ___).
300
 Julianne Imperato-Mcginley, et al, Androgens and the Evolution of Male-Gender Identity Among Male 
Pseudohermaphroditism With 5-Reductase Deficiency, 300 N England J Med 1233,1235 (1979).
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 Id.
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 Wilson, 14 Endocrine Reviews at 731 (cited in note ___).
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Gender role reversal appears to occur in about half the affected persons not diagnosed as 
infants or small children.303
No systematic studies have been done to ascertain the naturally occurring frequency of 
5-Reductase 2 deficiency.304
4. Persistent Müllerian Duct Syndrome
Persistent Müllerian Duct Syndrome (PMDS) is characterized by the persistence of .the 
Müllerian derivatives: uterus, fallopian tubes, and upper vagina in a person with all of the 
typical male anatomical characteristics with the possible exception that one or both of the 
testes may be undescended.305 At birth there is no evidence of external female 
characteristics. They usually remain unsuspected until the person affected suffers 
periodic abdominal pain or bleeding through his urethral opening after the onset of 
puberty.306 Although male fertility may be impaired, removing these internal female 
organs does not affect male fertility.307
PMDS can result from lack of production of MIS by the Sertoli cells in the testes. The 
mutation causes premature termination of the MIS hormone as it is being built.308 It can 
also result from the inability of Müllerian duct cells to process MIS due to inheritance of 
two copies of mutation in the Wnt-7a gene resulting in the inability to produce the 
signaling molecule Wnt-7a309 (which also plays a role in the formation of straight 
limbs.310)
No systematic studies have been done to ascertain the naturally occurring frequency of 
PMDS. A 1993 study reported 150 cases known up to that date.311
5. Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
The adrenocortical glands, located just above the kidneys, normally produce cortisol and 
aldosterone, hormones that regulates the body’s  sodium balance, energy supply, blood 
sugar level, and its reaction to stress.312 Ninety percent of all cases of Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia (“CAH”) result when a fetus inherits recessive copies of autosomal 
303 Jean D. Wilson, The Role of Androgens in Male Gender Role Behavior, 20 Endocrine Reviews 726, 731 
(1999).
304
 Blackless, et al, 12 Am J Hum Biol at 153 (cited in note ___).
305
 Money, Sex Errors at 32 (cited in n ___).
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 Id.
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 Id at 33.
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 Bertrand Knebelmann, et al, Anti-Müllerian Hormone Bruxelles: A Nonsense Mutation Associated with 
the Persistent Müllerian Duct Syndrome, 88 Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 3767,3770 (1991).
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 Brian A. Parr and Andrew P. McMahon, Sexually Dimorphic Development of  the Mammalian 
Reproductive Tract Requires Wnt-7a, 395 Nature 707,709 (1998).
310 David T. MacLaughlin, Jose Teixeira and Patricia K. Donahoe, Perspective: Reproductive Tract 
Development—New Discoveries and Future Directions, 142 Endocrinology 2167,2168 (2001).
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 Josso, et al, 48 Recent Progress in Hormone Research at 39 (cited in note ___).
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 Perrin C. White and Phyllis W. Speiser, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia due to 21-Hydroxylase 
Deficiency, 21 Endocrine Reviews 245,245-248. (2000).
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gene CYP21 on chromosome 21 from both parents.313 As a result the fetus is unable to 
produce the steroid 21-hydroxylase enzyme necessary for the production of cortisol and 
aldosterone.314 Instead, these glands produce elevated levels of the androgen 
androstenedione, which is converted downstream into testosterone and DHT.315 The 
presence of high levels of androgens during the 3rd and 4th months of gestation results in 
an enlarged clitoris (clitoral hypertrophy) and possibly fused labia in an XX fetus.316
These conditions can also result when androgens generated by an XY fraternal twin cross 
the placental barrier.317
At birth some CAH babies are judged to be boys.318 Others are judged to be girls with 
large clitorises. Many doctors recommend clitoral reductions for them.
Research on the sexual orientation of women who experienced CAH has yielded widely 
ranging results. In 1984 John Money and his colleagues reported that 11 of 30 young 
women treated for CAH considered themselves to be bisexual or homosexual.319 More 
recently, Zucker and colleagues reported that that a survey of young women who 
experienced CAH had no higher rate of homosexual orientation than a control group, 
however, they did have fewer heterosexual experiences than the control group.320 After 
extensive interaction with the intersexual community Suzanne Kessler’s impression is 
that adult intersexed women are more likely to be lesbians that women in general.321
After surveying the literature Fausto-Sterling and associates noted an extremely wide 
range of occurrence among population with a high of 3.47 per 1,000 live births among 
the Yupik tribe in Alaska.322 They estimate that worldwide rate of CAH is approximately 
0.0770 per 1,000 live births.323
313
 The remaining 10% of cases are caused by recessive genes leading to deficiencies in other enzymes 
involved in the production of aldosterone and cortisol: 3ß-Hydroxysteroid Dehydrogenase-3 Deficiency 
and 11 Hydroxylase Deficiency (only aldosterone production). Sodium imbalance does not threaten 
patients with the latter deficiency. However, they are often hypertensive. (Id at 248.)
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6. Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome
Meyer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome (“MRKHS”) results in unformed or 
underdeveloped Müllerian duct derivatives, namely, the uterus, fallopian tubes and upper 
vagina. A dimple or shallow pouch, unconnected to a uterus, appears where the vaginal 
orifice typically opens.324 After the onset of puberty failure to menstruate in the presence 
of ovaries raises a suspicion of MRKHS. Surgery or dilation therapy can be employed to 
provide a vagina-like orifice.325
MRKHS is not due to the absence of estrogen production in the XX embryo. However, 
maternal estrogens may play a compensatory role.326 Nor is it due to an inability to 
process estrogen.327  The cause of MRKHS is not yet fully understood. However, it 
appears that the signaling molecule Wnt-4, which is implicated in kidney development,328
also plays a role in the development of the Müllerian ducts.329
After surveying the literature Fausto-Sterling and associates estimate that MRKHS has a 
naturally occurring rate of approximately 0.1694 per 1,000 live births.330
D. Atypical Chromosomal Combinations
All of the conditions considered so far depend on variance from typical hormonal 
pathways in fetuses with a XX or XY sex chromosomes. We now turn to conditions 
resulting from an atypical combination of sex chromosomes.
1. Klinefelter Syndrome
Klinefelter Syndrome is the name given to persons with 1 Y chromosome and at least 2 
X chromosomes. The most typical combination is XXY.331 Kllinefelter Syndrome may 
result from an atypical cell division in the zygote just after fertilization. It more often 
occurs when either the sperm cell or the egg cell carries at least one extra sex 
chromosome as a result of an atypical cell division leading up to its creation.332
324
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Klinefelter Syndrome babies appear with the typical set of male anatomical 
characteristics at birth so there is usually little motivation to check for the presence of an 
extra X chromosome before puberty.333 Klinefelter Syndrome is usually diagnosed at 
puberty when breasts begin to develop in a female form and the penis and testes remain 
relatively small with the testes usually lacking the ability to create sperm cells.334
Reviewing 21 different surveys Fausto-Sterling and associates estimate the mean 
incidence of Klinefelter Syndrome to be approximately 0.922 per 1,000 live births 
classified as male.335 One study found that 1 in 300 spontaneously aborted fetuses had 
47,XXY characteristics indicating a conception rate of 1 in 1,000 (or 2 in 1,000 “male” 
conceptions.).336
2. Turner Syndrome
In contrast to Klinefelter Syndrome, which involves an extra sex chromosome, Turner 
Syndrome occurs when a person lacks a second complete sex chromosome (to 
complement a single X chromosome.) The second sex chromosome may have been lost 
in one of the earliest cell divisions in the newly formed fetus337 or the second X 
chromosome may have had an arm broken.338 Molecular analyses have demonstrated 
persons with Turner syndrome retain the maternal X chromosome in approximately two-
thirds of the cases with the paternal X chromosome retained in the other one-third of the 
cases.339
Turner Syndrome babies have a typical complement of external female genitalia at 
birth.340 However, 95-98% have “streak” ovaries.341 At puberty breasts do not mature due 
to the lower than typical level of estrogen present.342  Natural, unassisted pregnancies 
occur in approximately 2% of all cases of Turner Syndrome.343 Miscarriage (29%), 
stillbirth (7%) and congenital anomaly (20%) rates are very high.344
Fausto-Sterling and associates reviewed 18 studies of Turner Syndrome and estimate the 
mean incidence of Turner Syndrome to be approximately 0.369 per 1,000 live births 
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classified as female.345 Other studies have estimated that as many as 3 percent of all 
fetuses conceived experience loss or breakage of a second sex chromosome during 
gestation and only 1 percent of these survive to term.346
E. XX Males and XY Females
1. Background
Although Klinefelter Syndrome and Turner Syndrome involve an atypical number of 
chromosomes they each conform to a possible rule that “males” have at least 1 Y 
chromosome and “females” have no Y chromosomes. Not surprisingly, there are 
counterexamples to this rule.
The great American geneticist T. H. Morgan discovered sex chromosomes in the early 
part of the 20th century.347 At mid-century Barr developed the chromatic test to determine 
the presence or absence of a second X chromosome.348 Reports of XX males and XY 
females began to appear within the next few years.349  By 1981 de la Chapelle estimated 
the incidence of XX males to be 1 in every 20,000-25,000 newborn males.350 The 
presence of smaller, femininely sized teeth, determined by genes on the X chromosome, 
confirmed the hypothesis that a testis determining gene had translocated from the Y 
chromosome to the X chromosome.351 Analysis of X-linked blood traits inherited from an 
XX male subject’s father provided further evidence in favor of this hypothesis.352
In 1990 Sinclair, Berta, et al identified the Sex determining region of the Y chromosome 
in humans and mice, called it the SRY gene and proposed it as a candidate for “the elusive 
testis-determining gene, TDF.”353 Later that year they announced that they had found the 
SRY gene mutated on the Y chromosomes of two female XY subjects.354 Two years later 
McElreavey et al confirmed these results in a survey of 25 cases of XY females.355 In 
1993 McElreavey et al had analyzed the DNA of over 30 XX males with neither internal 
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nor external genital anomalies and found the SRY gene present in over 90% of the cases 
analyzed.356
2. Translocation
During mitotic cell division genes can translocate from one chromosome to its 
homologous partner.357 The SRY gene typically resides on the Y chromosome. However, 
prior to the completion of spermatogenesis this gene can translocate onto the X 
chromosome, the homologue of the Y chromosome. Thus, the SRY gene may be present 
in an XX fetus without any Y chromosomes. Similarly, the SRY gene may be absent in an 
XY fetus.
3. Life Isn’t So Simple
Ninety percent of the surveyed XX males without genital anomalies may have possessed 
the SRY gene, but 10% lacked that gene. Moreover, most XX males with genital 
anomalies lacked the SRY gene.358 As a result McElreavey “propose[d] that the SRY 
protein activates male sex determination by blocking synthesis or activity of Z protein, 
which is a negative regulator of male sex determination.”359
Research since 1993 suggests that the testis-determination is even more complex than the 
cascade model proposed by McElreavy et al. The editors of a recent (2001) review of the 
subject wrote
Following the isolation of the SRY gene ten years ago, a handful of other genes 
have meanwhile been identified, mainly by positional cloning in human sex 
reversal syndromes, and shown to play an essential role in early gonadal 
development and differentiation. These include SF1, WT-1, DAX1, SOX9 and, 
more recently, DMRT1. Other than SRY, an evolutionary newcomer found only in 
mammalian vertebrates, these genes are conserved in all vertebrates. So despite 
the differences in mechanisms vertebrates use to determine sex, the same basic set 
of transcription factor genes appears to operate. What has become clear is the fact 
that sex determination in vertebrates is not the result of a simple hierarchal 
cascade of gene actions as initially thought, but rather results from a complex 
network of positive and negative regulatory interactions.360
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Current research suggests that the SRY gene acts to inhibit the expression of the X-linked 
DAX-1 gene.361 The DAX-1 gene, in turn, acts to inhibit testis formation362 governed by 
expression of the SOX9 gene located on chromosome 17 in humans.363 This may be 
presented graphically as follows.
DAX1
SRY 
SOX9 testis
DAX1
no SRY
SOX9 no testis/
ovary
Interaction of SRY, DAX-1, and SOX9 genes in gonadal differentiation.
If DAX-1 is indeed an “anti-testis” gene, then testis formation will ensue in the absence of 
DAX-1 regardless of whether the SRY gene is present or absent.
F. Genetic Mosaicism and Chimerism
Even more complex development patterns can result if the fetus has a mixed karyotype 
caused by mosaicism or chimerism. Mosaicism results from an atypical cell division 
during the earliest phase of gestation that results in cell lines with two different sets of 
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chromosomes. Chimerism results when two separate fertilization events take place and 
cells from one fertilized zygote are incorporated into the body of another. Fine grained 
blood analysis often reveals mosaicism or chimerism.364
Mature egg cells result from two meiotic divisions.365 Egg cell generation begins when 
the primary oocyte, typically containing 46 chromosomes, undergoes the first meiotic 
division. In the first meiotic division
1. homologous chromosomes pair up 
2. a copy of each chromosome is created attached to the original copy (each copy is 
called a chromatid).
3. chromatid segments belonging to homologous chromosomes may be exchanged 
in crossover,
4. the homologous chromosome pairs split apart with one set of 23 (2 chromatid) 
chromosomes generating the secondary oocyte that inherits all of the cytoplasm 
(other, non-nuclear cell contents) and the other set of 23 (2 chromatid) 
chromosomes generating the primary polar body, which contains little else.
In the second meiotic division the double-structured chromosomes of the secondary 
oocyte splits into the mature ovum (which inherits all of the cytoplasm) and the 
secondary polar body (which does not detach from the ripe ovum before fertilization.)  
They contain chromosomes identical except for the results of crossovers. Although the 
secondary polar body consists of little more than 23 chromosomes not passed to the ripe 
ovum during the second meiotic division it can be fertilized by a sperm cell. 
The best understood form of chimerism results from fraternal twin zygotes exchanging 
blood cells during gestation.366 As a result, each zygote presents two different fine 
grained blood types. Two other forms of chimerism have been reported. The first of these 
forms of chimerism occurs when sperm cells separately fertilize both an egg cell and its 
attached polar body and the fertilized egg cell incorporates the fertilized polar body. A 
second type of chimerism occurs when zygotes created from the fertilization of two 
distinct egg cells fuse, no later than the 8 cell stage, before cellular differentiation begins.
Forty years ago Zuelzer et al367 reported a striking case of chimerism after a young man 
offered to be a blood donor in Detroit. He was the child of an African-American mother 
and a Caucasian father. Initial analysis of his blood showed that some but not all cells 
exhibited the sickle cell trait common to African-American including his mother. This 
provided one of the clues that two of his father’s sperm cells had fertilized two of his 
mother’s germ cells. His skin colors provided the other clue. Zuelzer et al described his 
skin color as “a very light café-au-lait color”368 but approximately 10% of his body 
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pigmentation was an appreciably darker brown!369 Analysis of his skin cells revealed that 
the lighter skin contained only XY cells. Samples of the darker skin, on the other hand, 
indicated an XX cell population of approximately 10%. Zuelzer et al reasoned that the 
10:1 ratio of genetic types seen in every system analyzed argued strongly in favor of 
incorporation of a fertilized polar body bereft of cell constituents other than 
chromosomes and against fusion of two fertilized egg cells.
Zygotic fusion of two fertilized egg cells has been demonstrated experimentally in mice  
and other species370 and inferred in one case involving a human being371 (on whom any 
such experimentation would be out of the question.) This child had ambiguous genitalia 
at birth.372 Five months after birth the child had a 2cm long clitoris. A laparotomy 
revealed an ovary on the right side and an ovotestis on the left side. It also revealed a 4cm 
long uterus connected to a normal Fallopian tube on the right side but not connected to 
the Fallopian tube on the left side.373 Lymphocyte analysis showed that 89-94% of these 
cells had a 46,XY karyotype with the remainder being 46,XX.374 However, analysis of 
the gonads showed that 1-15% of the cells in the ovary and histologically ovarian portion 
of the ovotestis “had similar proportions of XY cells (1-15%) as the testicular portion of 
the left gonad (13%).”375
Race and Sanger list 21 cases of genetic chimeras resulting from two fertilization events 
reported between 1962 and 1974.376
There have been at least two reports of the mirror image of zygotic fusion: the 
development of brother-sister twins from fertilization of a single egg cell by a single 
sperm cell. In each case fine grained analysis of blood types and other genetic markers 
displayed complete concordance arguing conclusively for the monozygotic origin of each 
pair of twins. In the first case377 the sister exhibited X0 karyotype and typical symptoms 
of Turner syndrome. Aside from being short (5’5”) the brother exhibited sexual 
characteristics consistent with the XY karyotype discovered throughout his body. In the 
second case378 the sister exhibited a mixture of X0 and XY karyotypes and some but not 
all of the symptoms of Turner syndrome. The brother displayed no female sexual 
369
 Id at 41.
370
 See A. K. Tarkowski, Mouse Chimaeras Developed from Fused Eggs, 190 Nature 857 (1961).
371
 Albert de la Chapelle, et al, Early Fusion of Two Human Embryos?, 38 Annals of Human Genetics 63 
(1974).  Dewald et al, questioned the conclusion that this chimeric individual resulted from the early fusion 
of two embryos noting that it could also have resulted from two different sperm cells fertilizing an ovum 
and a first division polar body. See Gordon Dewald, et al, Origin of  chi46,XX.46,XY Chimera in a Human 
True Hermaphrodite, 207 Science 321,322 (1980).
372
 Id at 64.
373
 Id.
374
 Id at 66.
375
 Id at 73
376
 Race and Sanger, Blood Groups in Man at 531-536.
377
 Raymond Turpin, et al, Présomption de monozygotisme en dépit d’un dimorphisme sexuel: sujet 
masculin XY et sujet neutre Haplo X., 252 Comptes rendus des séances de l'Academie des sciences 2945 (8 
Mai 1961).
378
 J. H. Edwards, Tessa Dent, and Jacob Kahn, Monozygotic Twins of Different Sex, 3 J Med Genetics 117 
(1966).
Michael L. Rosin Page 81 08/22/2004
characteristics. However, all of his cells analyzed displayed X0 karyotype although the 
investigators presumed he also had cells with XY karyotypes.
Both of these cases of mosaicism probably resulted from an atypical cell division very 
soon after a sperm cell carrying a Y chromosome fertilized an egg cell (carrying an X 
chromosome) followed very soon afterwards by the zygote splitting into two zygotes. In 
both cases the Y chromosome must have been lost to one descendant cell line while it 
remained in the other descendant cell line. In the first case the early zygote split so that 
one of the resulting zygotes received only X0 cells and the other only XY cells. In the 
second case zygotic splitting resulted in both zygotes getting both X0 and XY cells!379
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